Allan Meltzer Explains Why Friedman Would Never Endorse Increasing Inflation To Stimulate The Economy
Courtesy of Tyler Durden
From Allan Meltzer at the Wall Street Journal
Milton Friedman vs. the Fed: The Nobel laureate would never have endorsed increasing inflation to stimulate the economy.
Would the late Milton Friedman have endorsed the Federal Reserve’s plan to make large-scale purchases of long-term Treasury bonds? The idea here is to pump more money into and thus jump-start the economy, reducing unemployment. Some people, including this newspaper’s David Wessel in a column last week, believe the great Nobel laureate would favor this inflationary program. I am certain he would not.
Friedman’s main message for central banks was to maintain a monetary rule that kept the growth of the money supply constant. In his Newsweek column, “Inflation and Jobs” (Nov. 12, 1979), for example, Friedman emphasized that “unemployment is . . . a side effect of the cure for inflation,” so that if a central bank “cured” unemployment by inflating, it “will have unemployment later.” In other words, don’t try it.
Friedman’s Newsweek column for July 28, 1980 (“Improving Monetary Policy”) came with the unemployment rate rising past 7%. His proposals for improving policy made no mention of using monetary expansion to reduce unemployment. He proposed rules for stable growth to achieve target “dollar levels of monetary aggregates.”
Friedman served on President Reagan’s economic policy advisory board. His memos on monetary policy repeat the themes he made familiar to Newsweek readers and others all over the world. There is not a word suggesting that monetary policy should try to raise the inflation rate in order to reduce the unemployment rate.
This is unsurprising, as he had explained many times in the past that any such reduction would be temporary and last only until people caught on to the higher inflation. At that point, they would demand higher wages and interest rates.
Friedman made an exception to his rule about steady-state monetary policy in case of deflation. When prices fell, as they had during the Great Depression or in Japan in the 1990s, he urged the central bank to increase money growth. I served as one of two honorary advisers to the Bank of Japan in the 1990s. With short-term rates close to zero, I gave the same advice, urging the bank several times to buy long-term bonds or foreign exchange to increase money growth until deflation ended.
All this is not relevant now, since there is no sign of deflation in the United States. The Fed’s claim that there is a risk of deflation should embarrass it.