by ilene - April 27th, 2010 4:30 am
Yesterday’s article "Is 103 Months to Clear Housing Inventory Too Optimistic?" included an excerpt from the WSJ’s "Number of the Week: 103 Months to Clear Housing Inventory," suggesting there were at least 103 months of housing inventory yet to hit the market. Patrick Pulatie, CEO of Loan Fraud Investigations, wrote to me that he believed the 103 estimate was far too low.
One of Pat’s reasons was that "the HAMP modifications will have a failure rate of at least 75%. That is due to the Debt Ratios that the mods are approved at. In Feb, the mean ratio was 59.8%. In Mar, it was 62.7%, which to increase that much, most every Mar approval was far above the 62.7 number."
In this article, Pat discusses the HAMP loan modification program in more detail.
Courtesy of Patrick Pulatie (originally published at Implode-O-Meter Blog)
Over the last year, I have been watching the HAMP modification program with great interest. I have wanted to believe that the Federal Government would actually put into place a loan modification program that would help homeowners, though I knew that this was likely false hope. The results are now in, at least in my opinion.
HAMP is a fraud. Nothing else can be said otherwise. The Government has once again put into place a program that will not help homeowners. Instead, HAMP modifications will end up postponing homes foreclosures for a period of time for modified loans, but, most will end up losing the home in the end, except for a “very” lucky few who actually make it. I cannot believe that the Government expected anything other than the HAMP program would end up being a failure. To understand what to expect, we must look inside the numbers.
In March, the February results for HAMP were released. Key points of the update were:
* 1.3 million total trial modification offers.
* Almost 1.1 million trial modifications have begun since the program began.
* 72,000 new trial modifications started in February.
* More than 170,000 permanent modifications granted to date.
* 91,800 other permanent modifications offered and awaiting acceptance.
* 0.9% permanent modifications cancelled
* 8.8% total modifications cancelled, 88,663 total
If one looks at these numbers and compares the…
by phil - January 22nd, 2010 6:16 pm
Philstockworld is very proud to announce we have sold out and will now be sponsored by the Predatory Lending Association.
As it says in their mission statement – the PLA is dedicated to extracting maximum profit from the working poor by increasing payday loan fees and debt traps. The working poor are an exciting, fast growing demographic that includes: military personnel, minorities, and most of the middle class. In 2006, American families spent one in seven of their take home dollars on debt payments. The Predatory Lending Association is the only organization dedicated to helping you, the top 10% investors, capture these dollars.
by Zero Hedge - May 14th, 2009 1:00 pm
Courtesy of Tyler at Zero Hedge
In the latest twist of the Yellowstone Club
bankruptcy saga, presiding Judge Kirscher ruled
that investment bank Credit Suisse which had lent $375 million in first lien debt to the bankrupt club had engaged in predatory lending, and the resulting lien backing the loan would become subordinated equitably subordinated to virtually everyone including unsecured creditors. Can’t be good for those recovery prospects. According to court filings, the smart CS lending syndicate had lent the money to Yellowstone without even requesting audited financials
, among other "curious" decisions, all in the pursuit of the $7.5 million lender fee.
Here is what Kirscher had to say about this rare precedent:
"The only plausible explanation for Credit Suisse’s actions is that it was simply driven by the fees it was extracting from the loans it was selling, and letting the chips fall where they may. The only equitable remedy to compensate for Credit Suisse’s overreaching and predatory lending practices in this instance is to subordinate Credit Suisse’s first lien position to that of CrossHarbor’s super-priority debtor-in-possession financing and to subordinate such lien to that of the allowed claims of unsecured creditors."
What is hilarious is the disclosure of how CS determined the transaction fee in YC case: turns out the ultimate fee depended, literally, on a coin toss: CS had asked for a 3% transaction fee, while Timmy Blixseth wanted 2%, and the two settled the matter by flipping a coin to decide the final rate (Tim won). It will be interesting, as many more comparable criminal cases emerge and like disclosure swims to the surface, just how underwriters sat down with issuers in the current market squeeze to determine not only what the fees should be (roll of the die? tea leaves?), but how to skrew the shorts as much as possible. We will be waiting and watching.