Become a Big Bank, Ignore The Law
by ilene - June 30th, 2010 11:40 pm
Become a Big Bank, Ignore The Law
Courtesy of Karl Denninger at The Market Ticker
When the government began rescuing it from collapse in the fall of 2008 with what has become a $182 billion lifeline, A.I.G. was required to forfeit its right to sue several banks — including Goldman, Société Générale, Deutsche Bank and Merrill Lynch — over any irregularities with most of the mortgage securities it insured in the precrisis years.
But after the Securities and Exchange Commission’s civil fraud suit filed in April against Goldman for possibly misrepresenting a mortgage deal to investors, A.I.G. executives and shareholders are asking whether A.I.G. may have been misled by Goldman into insuring mortgage deals that the bank and others may have known were flawed.
Absolutely correct.
If you’re a big bank, when things go south the government will force those who dealt with you to give up their right to sue you for your misrepresentations!
“This really suggests they had myopia and they were looking at it entirely through the perspective of the banks,” Mr. Skeel said.
No, it says in plain English that if you’re a bank there are no laws.
There are no laws about money-laundering that will be enforced.
There are no laws about bribery that will be enforced.
There are no laws about bid-rigging that will be enforced.
There are no laws about emitting fraudulent securities that will be enforced.
And there are no laws about intentionally screwing counterparties that will be enforced.
Everyone else has to follow these laws.
But if you’re a big bank, you can do all these things and more, and there is absolutely no criminal or civil enforcement available to anyone to do anything about it.
May I ask, quite politely, why the American public peacefully accepts this state of affairs?
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Picture credits: Jr. Deputy Accountant
Additional Perspectives On The AIG Fiasco
by ilene - January 28th, 2010 3:37 pm
Additional Perspectives On The AIG Fiasco
Courtesy of Tyler Durden at Zero Hedge
While Tim Geithner may hope the AIG situation is now dead and buried, it is likely anything but, with the recently launched investigation into disclosure fraud by the SIGTARP, and the relentless efforts by Darrell Issa to metaphorically crucify the tax-challenged treasury secretary currently ongoing.
As these noble pursuits continue, we ask two simple questions:
1) In Yesterday’s hearings, it became clear that everyone essentially recused themselves of any oversight over the AIG disclosure issue, including Hank Paulson, with most, even Bernanke, claiming they had no control over the counterparty decision-making process. We ask – then who did? Surely someone at the FRBNY had to pull a trigger at some point. Who is that person? And if it is merely Sarah Dahlgren, is there a formal notification that she had obtained proxy power from Tim Geithner, who yesterday disclosed had recused himself only informally to a very select circle of TurboTax-challenged friends.
2) Why did the Fed not guarantee AIG’s assets ahead of the firm’s implosion. Surely, the realization, which as everyone trumpets these days, that AIG’s failure would have destroyed the world should have been known to at least one person in authority? And as all know, the collateral call toxic spiral commenced only once AIG was formally downgraded by the rating agencies. Well, had the AIG had the formal guarantee of the Federal Reserve, which is implicitly a guarantee by the U.S., then AIG would not have been downgraded in the first place, and no collateral calls would be forthcoming. Of course, Goldman would end up owning CDOs that as Janet Tavakoli points out, and contrary to what the Fed claims, are now worth at best pennies on the dollar. Furthermore, Goldman’s AIG CDS would immediately have become worthless, with Goldman unable to sell them in the open market for a profit of billions of dollars, yet the firm would continue extracting collateral as per its prior arrangement with AIG, in essence not impairing Goldman at all. And had AIG not started down the downgrade spiral, then numerous other adverse consequences of the nationalization of the insurance company would not have transpired. While it would not have saved America’s financial system, it would have made the descent more manageable. Yet with Goldman having benefited massively from the elimination of a vast…