by ilene - May 10th, 2009 10:25 pm
Jubliation has replaced fear, and the consensus is now that the second-worst bear market in US history ended on March 9th and it’s all champagne and roses from here.
In the meantime, let’s review what happened after the two other biggest bear market bottoms of the past century, 1932 and 1974 (see Prof Shiller’s chart above). In both cases, as now, the market had a sharp rally off the lows.
In real terms (after adjusting for inflation), the 1932 market almost doubled in a year. The 1974 market, meanwhile, jumped about 35% over two years.
But it’s what happened after that that matters now.
After doubling off the low, the 1930s bear market pushed another 50% higher over the next three years to 1937 (not bad!). But it then got cut in half again, and it remained below the 1937 peak for 15 years. In 1949, 17 years after the 1932 bear-market low, when the next secular bull market finally began again, the market was 50% below the 1937 rebound peak and about 70% below the 1929 bull-market peak.
In 1974, the market rebounded 35% in a couple of years. In 1982, however, eight years later, when the actual bull market began, it was back below the 1974 low. The 1973 peak, of course, was lower than the 1966 high, so the bear market that ended in 1982 was actually 16 years long.
That’s why they call them "secular" bear markets.
So even if March 9th was the bottom of a Great Bear Market that took stocks down 60%+ in 9 years from the 2000 peak (in real terms), let us not celebrate too much about what is likely coming next. As Jeremy Grantham has said, the great bear markets don’t hurry, and this one probably has a long way to run.
Here’s Merrill strategist David Rosenberg on this topic. Rosenberg, by the way, thinks the bear-market rally has now run its course and we’re going to quickly retest the March lows:
At this time, we believe it is necessary to provide clients with some historical
perspective from the last colossal credit collapse in the 1930s, understanding that
by Zero Hedge - May 10th, 2009 9:47 pm
Courtesy of Tyler Durden
by Zero Hedge - May 10th, 2009 9:41 pm
Courtesy of Tyler Durden
hat tip a a
by Zero Hedge - May 10th, 2009 3:31 pm
Courtesy of Tyler Durden at Zero Hedge
When speaking about the banking sector, many people mention a “subprime crisis” or a "financial crisis” as if recent write-downs and losses are caused by external events. Where some see coincidence, I see consequence. At Deutsche Bank, I consider our poor results to be a “management debacle,” a natural outcome of unfettered risk-taking, poor incentive structures and the lack of a system of checks and balances.
In my opinion, we took too much risk, failed to manage this risk and broke too many laws and regulations.
For more than two years, I have been working internally to improve the inadequate governance structures and lax internal controls within Deutsche Bank. I joined the firm in 2006 in one of its foreign subsidiaries, and my due diligence revealed management failures as well as inconsistencies between our internal actions and our external statements.
Beginning in late 2006, my conclusions were disseminated internally on a number of occasions, and while not always eloquently stated, my concerns were honest. Unfortunately, raising concerns internally is like trying to clap with one hand. The firm retaliated, and this raises the question: Is it possible to question management’s performance without being marginalized, even when this marginalization might be a violation of law? Two years later, our mounting losses are gaining attention, and I offer my experiences and my thoughts in the hopes of contributing to the shareholder and public policy debate.
Born and raised in Toledo, Ohio, I was infused with Midwestern values of hard work, individual responsibility, honesty, quiet integrity and fiscal prudence. After careers in New York City and Menlo Park, Calif.,
by ilene - May 10th, 2009 2:16 pm
Tyler Durden’s Weekend Reading
Courtesy of Zero Hedge
- Must-watch panel from Milken conference: Milken, James Walker, Steve Tananbaum, Stephen Nesbitt, David Malpass (Milken Institute)
- Words from the (investment) wise (The Big Picture)
- An offer you can’t refuse (Economist)
- The credit card squeeze (NYT)
- Vanishing credit lines for consumers and small businesses (GEA)
- Chavez seizures fuel Venezuela oil fears (FT)
- O’Connor, Volcker, Levitt main candidates to investigate crisis (Bloomberg)
- Evans-Pritchard: Enjoy the rally while it lasts (Daily Telegraph)
- Chrysler’s dissenting lenders abandon fight over Fiat sale (Bloomberg)
- Psychologists are better stockmarket speculators than economists (Alea)
- Shift to saving may be downturn’s lasting impact (NYT)
- LCH.Clearnet received $1.2 billion offer from ICAP-led group (Bloomberg)
- John Dizard: The long road to a "goog GM" filing (FT)
As always, sincerest gratitude for donations from Daniel, Evil, Hui, Jack, James, Jason, Jeffrey, John, Joel, Navid, Peter, Pooyan, Razvan, Roger, Steve, Vincent, and William.
Chartology [click on imag for larger view]:
by Zero Hedge - May 10th, 2009 2:03 pm
Courtesy of Tyler Durden at Zero Hedge
A little due diligence in this case reveals relevant facts. The 2019 White & Case filing from the Chrysler docket has some critical disclosure:
4. None of the Chrysler Non-TARP Lenders hold any credit default swaps or hedges with respect to their holdings of Senior Debt.
In other words, the original Non-TARP holdouts, who owned $295 million of Senior Debt, did not have one Chrysler Credit Default Swap to their name. Thus, being unhedged they did not stand to benefit at all from a Chrysler bankruptcy and any claims that they implicitly or explicitly pushed the company into bankruptcy are nonsensical (granted the question stays open of whether they had CDS at any point in the past, although that can not be gleaned from the filing).
If there really are CDS holding culprits (and we really are talking LCDS here) they would be in the non-holdout creditor camp. But most likely, CDS holders did not have secured long positions in the first place, and bankruptcy beneficiaries would likely not be found anywhere in the list of secured or unsecured creditors. However, due to the LCDS nature of the holdings, this is a case unlike GM or the recent finance company bankruptcies. Now, in GM things will likely get more interesting, as DTCC reports that the company has roughly $33.6 billion and $2.4 billion in gross and net CDS exposure, respectively.
As for any allegations that AIG was a taxpayer funnel again, this is not the case, as AIG rarely if ever underwrote single-name CDS (and much less LCDS). Thus comparing the AIG gift to banks in early 2009 with fund flows in the Chrysler and, soon to be, GM bankruptcies is in the apples and oranges realm.
by ilene - May 10th, 2009 12:35 am
Courtesy of Karl Denninger at The Market Ticker
by ilene - May 10th, 2009 12:19 am
Courtesy of Mark Thoma at Economist’s View
Tyler Cowen says congress is letting others take the responsibility – and the potential blame – for decisions it ought to be making:
There’s Work to Be Done, but Congress Opts Out, by Tyler Cowen, Economic View, NY Times: The longer the financial crisis runs, the more policy makers at the Treasury, the White House and the Federal Reserve are working around Congress rather than with it. It’s not that anyone is behaving illegally or unconstitutionally, but rather that Congress seems to want to be circumvented and to delegate more power to the executive branch as well as to the Fed, at least temporarily.
While Congressional leaders are consulted on the major policies, Congress is keeping its distance, perhaps to minimize voter outrage. This way, Congress can claim credit if a recovery comes, but deny responsibility if the price tag ends up higher than advertised or if banks seem to be receiving unfair benefits from the government.
Trillions of dollars of financial commitments have been made without explicit Congressional approval. … The traditional division of labor among policy makers was that the Fed determined the quantity of money in the economy — it set monetary policy — and Congress decided precise government expenditures — it handled fiscal policy. These new programs blur that distinction and, in essence, the Fed is running some fiscal policy. … A full description of important financial policies handled outside of Congress would more than fill this column and would add up to trillions of dollars in potential commitments and guarantees…
Both Democrats and Republicans are at fault for this apparent abdication of responsibility. The Republicans are focused on blaming the Democrats for bailouts, since they know the policies can go through without their support. The Democrats want to enjoy the benefits of making commitments and guarantees without accepting accountability or responsibility for them.
It’s a common theme in American history that crises expand the power of the executive branch of government, and that is part of what is happening here. Even the Federal Reserve, which … is supposed to be quasi-independent, has ceded much of its power to the Treasury. … Just as the Bush administration brought a growth of executive power in foreign policy and
by ilene - May 9th, 2009 11:48 pm
Courtesy of Mish
Inquiring minds are reading Controller John Chiang’s May 2009 California Budget Summary Analysis. Here a are few noteworthy items:
The State’s revenues continued to deteriorate in April. Total General Fund revenues were down $1.89 billion (-16%) from the latest estimates found in the 2009-10 Budget Act.
Personal income taxes were $1.06 billion below the estimate (-12.6%), corporate taxes were below the estimate by $831 million (-35.6%) and sales taxes lagged the estimate by $108 million (-19.9%).
Some of April’s sales tax receipts were pushed into early May, but declining taxable transactions still drove sales tax receipts well below the Budget Act projection. While California’s sales tax rate went up April 1, revenues from the new rate will not be seen until May.
Compared to April 2008, General Fund revenue in April 2009 was down $6.3 billion (-39%). The total for the three largest taxes was below 2008 levels by $6.3 billion (-40.3%). Sales taxes were $452 million lower (-50.9%) than last April, and personal income taxes were down $5.7 billion (-43.6%). Corporate taxes were $142 million below (-8.6%) April of 2008
Sales tax collections year to date are short $327 million (-1.8%) from the 2009-10 Budget Act. Income taxes were $653 million lower (-1.7%) than expected, and corporate taxes were $788 million lower than expected (-9.5%).
The State’s other revenue streams were $299 million below (-6.7%) the estimates. Because the 2009-10 Budget Act contained actual revenue through February 2009, these disparities only occurred in the months of March and April.
Send a Message
Taxation is not the way out of this mess, reduced spending is. Please consider California, Please Send A Message!
The propositions to raise taxes are already short, and borrowing money from the lottery is sheer madness. California citizens have a chance to tell the spendthrifts to go to hell. All it takes is an appropriate NO vote on 5 of 6 California 2009 ballot propositions on May 19.