Attack on Iran Underway
By Peter Zeihan
Peter Zeihan outlines a sweeping U.S. and Israeli military assault on Iran, describing it as a large-scale campaign aimed at crippling Tehran’s military infrastructure and destabilizing the regime. He details the scope of strikes across multiple cities, the heavy targeting of the IRGC and senior leadership, the legal controversy surrounding the lack of congressional authorization, and the strategic implications for Iran’s oil exports, nuclear program, and regional influence. Zeihan also highlights the potential ripple effects on Russia’s war in Ukraine and notes what may be a significant shift in U.S. military doctrine with expanded use of one-way drones.
Timeline
0:00 – Announcement of U.S. assault on Iran
0:24 – Scope of strikes across cities and military facilities
0:49 – Casualties and leadership losses
1:26 – Political structure and limits of regime decapitation
1:56 – Drone production and implications for Russia–Ukraine war
2:26 – Energy infrastructure
3:04 – War Powers Act and lack of congressional authorization
3:49 – Duration of operation and absence of ground force
4:13 – Iran’s current strategic weakness
4:39 – Nuclear program risks
5:28 – U.S. use of one-way drones and doctrinal shift
Transcript
Everybody, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. We are at war.
A couple of hours ago, Eastern time, the Trump administration launched a broad assault against numerous targets across Iran. At present, there are two aircraft carriers on station along with a significant number of supplementary aircraft. It appears to be a full-scale attempt to cripple military capabilities and potentially destabilize or overthrow the government.
There have been direct strikes on at least 20 cities, along with at least half a dozen naval facilities used for power projection. Nearly every known missile storage site and drone facility has also been targeted.
Damage reports are still incomplete, but early indications suggest thousands have been killed—possibly approaching 10,000. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran’s paramilitary force focused largely on domestic control, appears to have been hit hardest. The Minister of Defense has been confirmed dead, along with several members of the Iranian Security Council. Israel is participating in the operation and has reportedly focused much of its effort on targeting Iran’s leadership. At this time, it is not believed that the Iranian president or the Ayatollah have been killed, though senior officials certainly have.
A few key points to watch:
First, regarding Iran’s political structure: there are more than 10,000 members of the political class, most of them clerics. Even if parliament and top administrative leadership were eliminated, that would not necessarily collapse the government. This is one reason the United States and Israel are calling for a popular uprising to finish the job. Historically, such calls often produce the opposite effect, but we will see.
Second, on military capabilities: so far there is no clear evidence that Iranian drone production—particularly the Shahed drones*—has been eliminated, though that would be a logical next step. If those facilities are destroyed, it would significantly impact Russia’s use of Iranian drones in Ukraine, where they have become a primary tool for attacking power infrastructure and civilian areas.
Third, the energy sector does not appear to have been targeted yet. That makes sense operationally. The sequence typically goes: command and control, radar systems, missile sites, aircraft. Those strikes have occurred. However, Kharg Island—the critical oil export hub through which roughly 90% of Iran’s oil exports flow—remains operational. There has been a report of an explosion there, but it is unclear whether it resulted from an attack. Disabling Kharg Island would not be difficult, and it would effectively shut down Iran’s primary source of revenue.
Fourth, this is the first major military operation in roughly 40 years launched without first going to Congress. Under the War Powers Act, the president is required to notify Congress and then has 90 days to seek authorization. Previous administrations have questioned the constitutionality of the War Powers Act but still complied with it to avoid confrontation with Congress. This administration did not. Several senators from both parties are already criticizing the move as an overreach of executive power.
The operation has only been underway for a few hours. Given the scale of U.S. forces deployed, the current pace could likely be sustained for a week or two. Beyond that, the broader objectives become critical. Regime collapse is unlikely without a ground force, and there is no indication of U.S. preparations for a ground invasion. This appears to be a campaign to degrade military capacity rather than occupy territory.
Iran is currently in one of its weakest positions in decades. Oil exports are down to roughly one million barrels per day. Its ability to support proxy militias across the region has diminished, and many of its regional partners have been weakened—particularly by Israeli operations. This makes the present moment strategically opportune.
However, Iran’s nuclear program is dispersed and hardened. We are about to find out whether the U.S. military can meaningfully damage it. Previous administrations—Republican and Democratic alike—judged that the risks outweighed the benefits. Iran has long pursued breakout capability—the ability to rapidly assemble a nuclear weapon if needed—but has not actually built one. If the regime now believes it needs a nuclear deterrent, we will quickly discover whether past intelligence assessments were accurate.
One final point: this is the first major American military operation making extensive use of one-way drones alongside traditional assets such as Tomahawk missiles and precision airstrikes. If confirmed, this would signal a major shift in U.S. offensive doctrine toward drone-heavy warfare.
A great deal is happening. More to come.
[end of transcript]
Shahed drones (background)
An important connection between the U.S.–Israel strikes on Iran and the war in Ukraine runs through a class of inexpensive, one-way attack drones that have defined much of Russia’s aerial campaign. Originally developed by Iran’s Shahed Aviation Industries, these drones — especially the Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 — became a staple of Russia’s strategy against Ukrainian power grids and infrastructure because they are relatively cheap, long-range, and easy to launch in large numbers.
In mid-2023, the Kremlin worked with Tehran to establish a manufacturing facility in Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone tailored to producing these drones domestically. That facility has continued to operate and expand. Today, there is effectively a dual supply structure: Iran’s production capacity still exists, but Russia also manufactures a significant portion of these drones on its own territory and deploys them in Ukraine under local designations such as Geran-1 and Geran-2.
Because of this structure, a strike on Iran that disrupts Tehran’s industrial base could degrade Russia’s ability to sustain or evolve its drone production over time — particularly if it interrupts technology transfers, engineering support, or key components flowing into Moscow’s supply chain. It would be unlikely to stop Russia’s campaign outright, however, because Russia already operates active production facilities within its own borders. In short, disrupting Iranian drone factories might weaken Russia’s overall drone capacity gradually, but would not instantly eliminate Russia’s ability to use these weapons.
This matters because Russia’s strategy has emphasized volume as much as precision. Thousands of Shahed-type drones — and by Ukrainian government estimates, many thousands — have been launched against Ukraine, forcing Kyiv to expend scarce air-defense interceptors against relatively inexpensive threats while absorbing cumulative damage to power grids and civilian infrastructure. Even a modest reduction in that volume — whether through supply disruption, slower innovation, or industrial constraints — could ease operational pressure on Ukraine’s defenses.
Ukraine has adapted, building layered air defenses and developing its own drone and counter-drone capabilities, and reported interception rates have improved over time. But absent a reduction in the scale or quality of Russia’s drone stream, Kyiv must continue allocating significant resources to defense rather than offense. Any sustained degradation of Russia’s cheap, scalable attack drone network would gradually shift the attrition dynamic back in Ukraine’s favor.
The connection between Iran’s industrial capacity and Russia’s strike campaign is therefore real and consequential — but it is not a simple on-off switch. The full impact will depend on the extent of any damage to Iran’s production base, the durability of Russia’s domestic facilities, and how quickly each side adapts.
References
-
Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign in Ukraine – Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
https://www.csis.org/analysis/drone-saturation-russias-shahed-campaign -
Investigation: How Russian Drones Exploit European Technologies to Strike Ukraine and Beyond – The Kyiv Independent
https://kyivindependent.com/investigation-how-russian-drones-exploit-european-technologies-to-strike-ukraine-and-beyond/ -
Field Dispatches (Shahed / Geran Technical Investigations) – Conflict Armament Research
https://www.conflictarm.com/field-dispatches/ -
Russia Is Building Iranian-Designed Attack Drones at a Factory in Tatarstan – The Washington Post
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2023/08/17/russia-iran-drone-shahed-alabuga/ -
Russia Doubles Down on the Shahed – International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/04/russia-doubles-down-on-the-shahed/ -
Update: Alabuga’s Production Rate of Shahed-136 Drones – Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/update-alabugas-production-rate-of-shahed-136-drones -
The Alabuga Drone Plant: Key Relationships Enabling Iranian Support to the Russian Military – Iran Watch
https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/alabuga-drone-plant-case-study-key-relationships-enabling-iranian-support-russian-military -
Drone Debris Found in Ukraine Indicates Russia Is Using New Technology from Iran – Associated Press
https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2025/drone-debris-found-in-ukraine-indicates-russia-is-using-new-technology-from-iran/ -
Iranian Drones in Ukraine: Supply Chains and Component Analysis (PDF Report) – International Partnership for Human Rights
https://iphronline.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/report-drones-final_3.07-1.pdf -
Tracking the Components of Missiles and UAVs Used by Russia in Ukraine (Research Paper) – International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library—content–migration/files/research-papers/2025/09/pub25-094-tracking-the-components-of-missiles-and-uavs-used-by-russia-in-ukraine.pdf -
A New US Military Task Force Just Used Its Cheap Shahed Lookalike Drones for the First Time to Strike Iran – Business Insider
https://www.businessinsider.com/new-us-military-force-used-cheap-attack-drones-first-time-2026-2 -
The Latest: Iran Launches Retaliatory Strikes as Trump Calls for Regime Change – 2News
https://www.2news.com/news/national/the-latest-trump-calls-for-iranians-to-rise-up-as-us-and-israel-launch-strikes/article_08f8d415-ce39-5767-b03a-fe1f77e2f5ab.html -
Shahed Drones – Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shahed_drones -
Yelabuga Drone Factory – Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yelabuga_drone_factory -
Ukraine’s Zelenskiy Says It Is Important That US Act Decisively on Iran – Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-says-it-is-important-that-us-act-decisively-iran-2026-02-28/
