In the two videos below, geopolitical analyst Ian Bremmer of Eurasia Group explains what he believes is happening in the U.S.–Iran war. While Donald Trump may find it relatively easy to start a war, ending one is far more complicated. Bremmer explains why neither side is clearly winning, how disruption around the Strait of Hormuz has become a key pressure point, and why the consequences may be harder to control than the decision to begin the war.
Trump’s gamble in Iran ~ Ian Explains
What is President Trump trying to achieve in Iran, and how does his strategy compare to past US interventions in the Middle East? More here >
Transcript
Let’s talk home décor. What’s your poison? Crate & Barrel, West Elm, Target. For the late U.S. statesman Colin Powell, the reference point was Pottery Barn.
As Bob Woodward wrote in Plan of Attack, his 2004 account of the start of the Iraq War, Powell invoked what he called the “Pottery Barn rule” when counseling President George W. Bush. He warned Bush that if the United States invaded Iraq, it would become the “proud owner” of 25 million people. It would own all their hopes, aspirations, and problems. In other words: you break it, you own it.
That was the logic of the Iraq War era. The country was still shaken by the trauma of September 11. The Bush administration warned of a “smoking gun” that could become a “mushroom cloud.” Powell appeared before the United Nations holding up a small vial to symbolize Iraq’s alleged chemical weapons stockpiles. The U.S. government made a full-court-press case for war, and in doing so, it took ownership of that war and what followed.
President Trump, however, has never been a Pottery Barn man. If his renovation of the Oval Office is any guide, he leans more toward Liberace. And in the run-up to “Epic Fury,” the massive joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, Trump did not offer one coherent case for war. He offered several.
At various points, the rationale seemed to be preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, destroying its ballistic missiles before they could threaten the United States, assassinating the Supreme Leader before he could target Trump, freeing the Iranian people from repression, and even regime change. It may look like confusion or inconsistency, but the argument here is that the muddle was actually the point.
Trump did not fail to sell the war to the American people, Congress, or U.S. allies. He chose not to build a single, coherent justification. In doing so, he is effectively betting that he will not have to own what comes next. For Trump, the immediate spectacle has always mattered more than the aftermath.
The former reality television host has staged a dramatic show, and he appears to know it. In a reported phone call with an ABC News reporter, Trump reportedly asked, in reference to the war, “How do you like the performance?” He then compared it to Venezuela and suggested this might be even better. Asked how long the war would last, he reportedly said that some people already believe it is over, but that for him it is over only when he decides it is over.
But the Iranian regime also knows how to stage a spectacle. As Iranian missiles continue to get through Israeli defenses and hit targets in Israel and wealthy Gulf states, as American service members are killed, and as oil prices rise, Trump may find that he cannot simply lower the curtain on this conflict whenever he wants.
The core argument of Bremmer’s commentary is that Trump’s approach to Iran differs sharply from the Bush-era model. Bush, for all the catastrophic consequences of Iraq, made an explicit argument for war and thereby accepted ownership of the war’s outcome. Trump appears to be trying something different: wage war without clearly defining its purpose, and then deny responsibility for whatever follows.
That may work politically for a while, especially if the administration can claim tactical success or simply shift the narrative. But wars do not always cooperate with political messaging. Once the missiles fly, troops are exposed, energy markets react, and adversaries retaliate, the consequences become harder to control.
So the real question raised here is not just what Trump is trying to achieve in Iran. It is whether he believes the United States can “break” part of the Middle East this time without “owning” the consequences. Bremmer’s answer is that Trump is gambling that he can. The danger is that reality may not give him that option.
Trump, Iran, And The Global Economy: Ian Bremmer On The War That “No One is Winning”
Bremmer explains why the Middle East war is a “no-win” situation for the US and Iran, but a major problem for the rest of the world. More here >
Transcript
Ian Bremmer argues that the current conflict places the United States and Iran in a situation where neither side is clearly winning. From his perspective, President Trump appears to be losing politically because the war aims he announced were largely unachievable. The administration talked about regime change in Iran and influencing who might lead the country next, but those outcomes are highly unlikely. That means the Iranian regime will remain in place and capable of continuing to cause problems for the United States in the future. Trump is therefore already looking for an off-ramp from the conflict.
At the same time, Bremmer cautions that it would be difficult to say Iran is winning either. Iran has suffered severe losses. Its supreme leader has been killed, much of its military leadership has been eliminated, and its regional proxy network has been weakened. Hezbollah, once one of the most powerful non-state military forces in the world, is being heavily damaged by Israeli operations. Iran’s economy was already struggling before the war and is now under even greater pressure. In Bremmer’s view, the situation is best described as one in which Iran is suffering enormous damage while Trump is failing to achieve his stated objectives.
Iran’s strategy appears to focus on creating global economic pressure rather than defeating the United States militarily. Bremmer emphasizes that the most significant development in the conflict is disruption around the Strait of Hormuz, through which a large portion of the world’s oil supply normally passes. Even limited disruptions there can cause large global economic consequences. Countries far from the conflict are already feeling the effects through higher energy prices and supply disruptions.
Bremmer compares Iran’s strategy to China’s response to American tariffs. China was the weaker economic power but demonstrated a willingness to endure economic pain while imposing costs on the United States that Americans might not tolerate politically. Iran appears to be attempting something similar. While it cannot defeat Israel militarily, it may be able to raise global oil prices and economic pressure enough to make the war politically unsustainable in the United States. Americans generally will not tolerate prolonged energy price spikes such as $4 gasoline or $100 oil.
Although the United States has promised to ensure oil shipments continue through the Strait of Hormuz, Bremmer says the reality is more complicated. Shipping companies are currently unwilling to send tankers through an active war zone. Even if the United States offers financial compensation or insurance coverage, shipping firms are prioritizing crew safety. Until military activity in the region decreases, commercial traffic through the strait is unlikely to resume normally. Iran’s use of inexpensive drones to threaten shipping creates persistent risk that is difficult to eliminate.
Oil prices have moderated somewhat due to releases from strategic petroleum reserves and international coordination, but the underlying disruption remains unprecedented. For now, little to no energy traffic is moving through the strait, which continues to place pressure on oil, natural gas, and fertilizer prices worldwide.
When asked whether there is any visible off-ramp from the conflict, Bremmer suggests Trump could attempt to declare victory unilaterally. Trump has already hinted that he might frame the war as a success by emphasizing destroyed Iranian military capabilities. Politically, Trump has greater ability than most presidents to redefine events for his supporters. However, even if the United States attempts to disengage, Israel and Iran may continue the conflict.
Israel appears less interested in ending the war quickly. Statements from Israeli leadership suggest an ongoing effort to weaken or destroy the Iranian regime. Meanwhile, Iran’s military operations are now partly decentralized. Local commanders are operating independently using what the country calls a “mosaic strategy,” which allows them to launch drone attacks without centralized coordination. Even if national leaders seek de-escalation, these decentralized actions could continue causing disruption.
This strategy also explains why Iran has been targeting Gulf states such as the UAE and Qatar. After the destruction of parts of Iran’s central command structure, local commanders are focusing on nearby, softer targets that are easier to reach with short-range weapons. Many of these targets are civilian infrastructure—airports, hotels, and commercial buildings—in countries like the UAE that are geographically close and economically visible. Even relatively small attacks can damage the region’s reputation as a safe hub for tourism and global commerce.
Bremmer also examines the broader geopolitical consequences of the conflict. Russia stands to benefit in several ways. Higher oil and gas prices increase Russian export revenues, and global energy shortages increase demand for Russian energy. In addition, the United States is redirecting military resources toward the Gulf rather than Ukraine, which reduces pressure on Russia’s war effort there.
China faces short-term economic harm because it relies heavily on energy shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz and purchases large amounts of Iranian oil. However, Bremmer believes China may benefit strategically in the longer term because instability highlights the limits of American reliability as a global partner. Countries around the world may increasingly view China as a geopolitical hedge. China’s long-term investments in electrification, renewable energy, nuclear power, and electric vehicles also reduce its vulnerability to oil disruptions.
India, by contrast, is among the countries most negatively affected by the conflict. Its economy relies heavily on energy imports and it lacks the geopolitical leverage of Russia or China to benefit strategically from the crisis.
Looking ahead, Bremmer does not expect the conflict to end quickly. Even if the United States halts its military operations soon, regional instability will likely continue. Iran may pursue terrorist attacks in the region or beyond, either through coordinated operations or smaller lone-actor attacks. The conflict also increases the likelihood that Iran will accelerate efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Bremmer notes that Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile remains intact, and Israeli officials have reportedly urged the United States to conduct high-risk operations to eliminate that capability.
At the same time, American military operations may soon slow simply because the available stockpile of munitions for sustained strikes is limited. Within days, the intensity of U.S. strikes could decrease. That would likely reduce the pace of the war but would not necessarily end it.
Bremmer’s overall conclusion is that the war has placed the United States in a difficult strategic position. The conflict was relatively easy to start but much harder to end. Without cooperation from other international actors—and without a clear path to achieve its original goals—the United States may find itself trapped in a prolonged and destabilizing regional conflict.
