Moral Hazard and Economic Donkeys
by ilene - September 13th, 2009 9:46 pm
Moral Hazard and Economic Donkeys
Courtesy of Jesse’s Café Américain
"It’s almost as if the biggest credit bubble in history never occurred. Investors are increasingly convinced that a sustainable global recovery is emerging out of the wreckage. All praise to the central bankers for saving the world! I’m waiting till someone writes about the return of the Great Moderation and suggests Ben Bernanke is the new Maestro. Then I’ll know the lunatics have taken over the madhouse…yet again." Albert Edwards, Société Générale
What Simon Johnson is describing in this essay attached below is moral hazard, the corruption of the capitalist system introduced by a Fed (the Economic Donkeys) that recklessly exercises a function as ‘lender of last resort,’ in conjunction with a political environment (less sophisticated Economic Donkeys) that can be politely described as being driven by ‘regulatory capture’ rather than the less euphemistic ‘rampant corruption.’
Moral hazard is not a popular topic, on the left or on the right. When moral hazard was mentioned as a consideration in the bank bailouts proposed by then Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, a popular liberal economist bombastically expounding with a blog (PLEBEWAG) went into a hissy fit of self-righteous indignation, condemning those who even think about things like ‘moral hazard’ as fundamentalist ethical Luddites.
The problem is that moral hazard is an ethical consideration, a restraint on the tools available for centralized financial engineering. This aversion to restraint is characteristic of neither the moderate right nor the left per se, but it does distinguish the statists from those who favor the individuals and ‘market-based capitalism.’
What can one think about these things, when so many economists can get it so wrong, for so long, with such passionate intensity, and remain largely unapologetic and unchanged themselves, swearing allegiance to the power of financial engineering with just a little more power and purview? Hence the proposal to centralize regulation in the Fed, surely one of the most bizarre suggestions after a crisis caused by the Fed that one can imagine.
It is all part of the momentum of the status quo, those who enable a system at least in part because they believe it in as a first principle, benefit from it, even if they are not direct participants, or may only wish to be beneficiaries of the greater power and prestige of the State.