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Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Time to Spill the Beans?

Going through the SEC filing and press releases by Green Mountain Coffee Roasters led Sam Antar to ask Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Time to Spill the Beans? Specific dates would make a good first step. – Ilene 

Courtesy of Sam Antar, White Collar Fraud

To truly exonerate itself after the discovery of certain material violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), Green Mountain Coffee Roasters (NASDAQ: GMCR) needs to come clean with investors and disclose exactly when it found certain accounting errors. In addition, Green Mountain needs to provide clearer and more transparent disclosures to investors about the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) inquiry and the discovery of those errors.

Timing of certain disclosures

On Monday, September 20, 2010, the SEC notified Green Mountain Coffee Roasters that it was conducting an informal inquiry and requested it voluntarily submit information concerning “revenue recognition practices and the Company’s relationship with one of its fulfillment vendors.”

Eight days later, on September 28, 2010, Green Mountain surprised investors by disclosing news of the SEC inquiry in an 8-K filing with the SEC. In that same 8-K report, Green Mountain disclosed that it discovered an "immaterial accounting error" affecting financial reports issued from 2007 to 2010: 

In connection with the preparation of its financial results for its fourth fiscal quarter, the Company’s management discovered an immaterial accounting error relating to the margin percentage it had been using to eliminate the inter-company markup in its K-Cup inventory balance residing at its Keurig business unit. Management discovered that the gross margin percentage used to eliminate the inter-company markup resulted in a lower margin applied to the Keurig ending inventory balance effectively overstating consolidated inventory and understating cost of sales. Management determined that the accounting error arose during fiscal 2007 and analyzed the quantitative impact from that point forward to June 26, 2010.

As of June 26, 2010, there is a cumulative $7.6 million overstatement of pre-tax income. Net of tax, the cumulative error resulted in a $4.4 million overstatement of net income or a $0.03 cumulative impact on earnings per share.

After evaluating the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the error in accordance with applicable accounting literature, including Staff Accounting Bulletins published by the SEC, the Company, with the participation of the audit committee of the Board of Directors, has determined that the correction in the margin calculation represents a correction of an error in accordance with Accounting Standards Codification 250 Accounting Changes and Error Corrections, that the correction was not material to the fiscal years and the respective quarters ended 2007, 2008 and 2009 and that the Company anticipates that the correction will not be material to fiscal year 2010 and the respective quarters of fiscal 2010. As a result, the Company anticipates the cumulative amount of the accounting correction will be made in the quarter ended September 25, 2010. [Bold and italicized emphasis added.]

Green Mountain did not disclose exactly when it discovered the margin error but only that the margin error was discovered “In connection with the preparation of its financial results for its fourth fiscal quarter…..” Green Mountain’s fiscal year ended on September 25, 2010. Usually companies prepare for their year-end audits up to two months in advance.

Two scenarios

If Green Mountain had discovered the margin error before it was notified about the SEC inquiry, on September 20, 2010, why didn’t the company disclose the margin error to investors earlier, instead of waiting until it filed its 8-K report September 28, 2010?

If Green Mountain discovered the margin error after it was notified about the SEC inquiry, on September 20, 2010, why was the company able to find an accounting error within eight days or by September 28, 2010, when it didn’t find the error during the previous fiscal years (2007 to 2010)? This scenario is possible, but it would be very coincidental.

The unknown timing of Green Mountain’s discovery of its margin error raises the question: did the company disclose the error to investors when it was discovered or did the company wait?

Green Mountain’s Common Stock Purchase Agreement with Luigi Lavazza S.p.A.

In that same September 28, 2010 8-K report, Green Mountain disclosed that it closed its Common Stock Purchase Agreement with Luigi Lavazza S.p.A. See below:

On September 28, 2010, Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), completed a sale of 8,566,649 shares (the “Shares”) of its common stock, par value $0.10 per share (“Common Stock”), to Luigi Lavazza S.p.A., an Italian corporation (“Lavazza”), for an aggregate purchase price of $250,000,000. The sale of the Shares was effected pursuant to the Common Stock Purchase Agreement, dated as of August 10, 2010 (the “SPA”), by and between the Company and Lavazza. The execution of the SPA was previously reported by the Company in its Current Report on Form 8-K filed by the Company with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on August 11, 2010, and the full text of the SPA was filed as Exhibit 10.1 thereto. 

In connection with the stock purchase agreement, Green Mountain provided certain warranties that the Company and its auditors have not identified and are not aware of:

(A) any significant deficiency or material weakness in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting utilized by the Company; (B) any illegal act or fraud, that involves the Company’s management or other employees; or (C) any claim or allegation regarding any of the foregoing that would have a Material Adverse Effect. [Bold and italicized emphasis added.]

.07 A significant deficiency is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control that is less severe than a material weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by those charged with governance.

A material weakness in internal controls generally arises when accounting errors have a “reasonable possibility” of causing a company to restate its financial reports to correct those errors. A "significant deficiency" in internal controls arises when accounting errors are not material enough to cause a restatement of financial reports, but are instead corrected by making a cumulative adjustment to the latest period’s financial reports.

Initially, Green Mountain claimed that its margin error was “immaterial” and disclosed that it would correct that error by making a cumulative adjustment to its Q4 2010 financial reports, rather than restate its financial reports issued from 2007 to 2010. At the very least, that margin error appeared to result from a “significant deficiency” under auditing rules. It could be a breach of warranty under Green Mountain’s Common Stock Purchase Agreement with Luigi Lavazza, though Green Mountain never told investors that may have breached a key warranty under its agreement with Luigi Lavazza.

Green Mountain initially entered into its agreement to sell shares to Luigi Lavazza on August 10, 2010. On the following day, Green Mountain disclosed to investors that:

On August 10, 2010, Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Green Mountain” or the “Company”), and Luigi Lavazza S.p.A., an Italian corporation (“Lavazza”), entered into a Common Stock Purchase Agreement (the “SPA”). Pursuant to the terms of the SPA, Lavazza has agreed to make a $250,000,000 investment (the “Investment”) in Green Mountain’s common stock, par value $0.10 per share (“Common Stock”), at a purchase price per share equal to the volume-weighted average price of the Common Stock for the 60 trading days before the closing of the Investment, less 7.5% (the “Shares”). [Bold and italicized emphasis added.]

Thus, Lavazza’s "purchase price per share would be equal to the volume-weighted average price of the Common Stock for the 60 trading days before September 28, 2010, less 7.5% (the “Shares”).” If the share price were to have dropped prior to Sept. 28, it would be reflected in Lavazza’s final purchase price.

Based on the agreed upon terms, Luigi Lavazza paid $250 million to purchase 8,566,649 shares, or an average price per share of $29.18 which was computed as follows:

$31.55 gross volume-weighted average price of the Common Stock less 7.5% discount or $2.37 equals $29.18.

On September 28, 2010, Green Mountain closed its Common Stock Purchase Agreement with Luigi Lavazza. Later that same day, after the stock market closed, the company finally disclosed the SEC inquiry and the discovery of the margin error to investors.

On September 29, 2010, Green Mountain stock dropped $5.95 per share to close at $31.06 per share, a 16.1% drop in market value that day in reaction to news of the SEC inquiry and accounting error. The stock continued to drop to $26.87 per share on October 11, 2010.

Green Mountain’s gross "volume-weighted average price" per share of stock in the sixty trading days prior to closing its Common Stock Purchase Agreement with Luigi Lavazza was about $31.55 per share. Apparently, if Green Mountain had waited to close the deal until after it disclosed news of the SEC inquiry and margin error, Luigi Lavazza would have paid less money per share to the company. This leads to the question: did Green Mountain purposely delay disclosure to investors of the SEC inquiry, the margin error, significant weaknesses in internal controls, and possible breaches of representations and warranties under its agreement with Luigi Lavazza?

Or did Green Mountain give early warning to Luigi Lavazza under the terms of their confidential agreement? (See Common Stock Purchase Agreement Section 7). In such case, did Luigi Lavazza not care about the probable negative impact on the stock price after the SEC inquiry and margin errors were disclosed to investors? And if so, why not?

More accounting errors discovered

On November 19, 2010, Green Mountain filed an 8-K report updating investors about the margin error itdisclosed on September 28, 2010 and also disclosed additional accounting errors:

["Margin error"] A $7.6 million overstatement of pre-tax income, cumulative over the restated periods, due to the K-Cup inventory adjustment error previously reported in the Company’s Form 8-K filed on September 28, 2010. This error is the result of applying an incorrect standard cost to intercompany K-Cup inventory balances in consolidation. This error resulted in an overstatement of the consolidated inventory and an understatement of the cost of sales. Rather than correcting the cumulative amount of the error in the quarter ended September 25, 2010, as disclosed in the September 28, 2010 Form 8-K, the effect of this error will be recorded in the applicable restated periods.

$1.4 million overstatement of pre-tax income, cumulative over the restated periods, due to the under-accrual of certain marketing and customer incentive program expenses. The Company also has corrected the classification of certain of these amounts as reductions to net sales instead of selling and operating expenses. These programs include, but are not limited to, brewer mark-down support and funds for promotional and marketing activities. Management has determined that miscommunication between the sales and accounting departments resulted in expenses for certain of these programs being recorded in the wrong fiscal periods.

$1.0 million overstatement of pre-tax income, cumulative over the restated periods, due to changes in the timing and classification of the Company’s historical revenue recognition of royalties from third party licensed roasters. Because royalties were recognized upon shipment of K-Cups by roasters pursuant to the terms and conditions of the licensing agreements with these roasters, Keurig historically recognized these royalties at the time Keurig purchased the K-Cups from the licensed roasters and classified this royalty in net sales. Management has determined to recognize this royalty as a reduction to the carrying cost of the related inventory. The gross margin benefit of the royalty will then be realized upon the ultimate sale of the product to a third party customer. Due to the Company’s completed and, when consummated, pending acquisitions of third party licensed roasters, these purchases and the associated royalties have become less of a factor, since the post-acquisition royalties from these wholly-owned roasters are not included in the Company’s consolidated financial statements.

An $800,000 overstatement of pre-tax income, cumulative over the restated periods, due to applying an incorrect standard cost to intercompany brewer inventory balances in consolidation. This error was identified during the preparation of the fiscal year 2010 financial statements and resulted in an overstatement of the consolidated inventory and an understatement of the cost of sales.

$700,000 understatement of pre-tax income for the Specialty Coffee business unit, due primarily to a failure to reverse an accrual related to certain customer incentive programs in the second fiscal quarter of 2010. The over-accrual was not identified and corrected until the fourth fiscal quarter of 2010.

In addition to the errors described above, the Company also will include in the restated financial statements certain other immaterial errors, including previously unrecorded immaterial adjustments identified in audits of prior years’ financial statements. [Bold and italicized emphasis added.]

Green Mountain also claimed that:

… these errors were discovered by management during the course of its preparation of the year-end financial statements and audit, as well as during the course of an internal investigation initiated by the audit committee of the Company’s board of directors in light of the previously disclosed inquiry by the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) Division of Enforcement. [Bold and italicized emphasis added.]

In its September 28, 2010 8-K report, Green Mountain claimed that the margin error was discovered “In connection with the preparation of its financial results for its fourth fiscal quarter.” Presumably, the additional errors listed in the November 19, 2010 8-K report were discovered during the internal investigation after the SEC notified the company of it informal inquiry.

We still don’t know exactly when Green Mountain discovered the margin error, whether it was before or after the company learned about the SEC inquiry on September 20, 2010. However, we now know that Green Mountain found several new accounting errors about sixty days after it was notified of the SEC inquiry. It also appears that Green Mountain is taking the position that its errors were "immaterial."

Materiality of accounting errors

Originally on September 28, 2010, Green Mountain disclosed that it overstated pre-tax income from 2007 to 2010 because of the margin error. The company claimed that the margin error was “immaterial” and said it would correct that error by making a cumulative adjustment to earnings “in the quarter ended September 25, 2010.”


On November 19, 2010, Green Mountain disclosed three new overstatements totaling $3.2 million pre-tax income and one new understatement of $0.7 million in pre-tax income, making a total overstatement of $10.1 million in pre-tax income. This time, the company announced that it would restate its financial reports issued from 2007 to 2010 to correct all of its errors:

On November 15, 2010, the board of directors of Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc. (the “Company”), based on the recommendation of the audit committee and in consultation with management, concluded that, because of errors identified in the Company’s previously issued financial statements for the fiscal years ended September 29, 2007, September 27, 2008 and September 26, 2009 and the first three fiscal quarters of 2010, the Company will restate its previously issued financial statements, including the quarterly data for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 and its selected financial data for the relevant periods. Accordingly,investors should no longer rely upon the Company’s previously released financial statements for these periods and any earnings releases or other communications relating to these periods. [Bold and italicized emphasis added.]

Green Mountain did not identify any specific accounting error as "material." However, under SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, accounting errors are material when they cause the "financial statements taken as a whole" to be "materially misstated" or "materially misleading." Such errors must be corrected by restating financial reports, instead of using a cumulative adjustment to the latest quarter’s report to correct those errors.

How Green Mountain tried to spin the materiality issue

In its November 19, 2010 8-K report, Green Mountain tried to minimize to seriousness of its accounting errors by using carefully crafted language claiming that:

The effects on certain reported periods are quantitatively significant, and the impact of the individual errors will be disclosed in more detail in the Company’s restated financial statements.
 
The adjustments necessary to correct the errors will have no effect on reported cash flow from operations, and are not expected to have a material impact on the balance sheet.
Such errors can still be cause "financial statements taken as a whole" to be "materially misstated" or "materially misleading." SAB No. 99 directly addresses that issue:

If the misstatement of an individual amount causes the financial statements as a whole to be materially misstated, that effect cannot be eliminated by other misstatements whose effect may be to diminish the impact of the misstatement on other financial statement items. To take an obvious example, if a registrant’s revenues are a material financial statement item and if they are materially overstated, the financial statements taken as a whole will be materially misleading even if the effect on earnings is completely offset by an equivalent overstatement of expenses.

Even though a misstatement of an individual amount may not cause the financial statements taken as a whole to be materially misstated, it may nonetheless, when aggregated with other misstatements, render the financial statements taken as a whole to be materially misleading. [Bold and italicized emphasis added.] 

For example, Company A and Company B are both competitors and each company has $100 of revenue, $100 of expenses, and zero profits. Both companies make only cash sales to customers and pay all of their expenses in cash. Each company started and ended the year with $100 in cash because they had zero profits.

Company A wants to make it appear that it has more market share (revenues) than company B and it inflates revenues and expenses by $100 each to report $200 of revenues, $200 of expenses, and but still zero profits. At the end of the year both companies report zero profits, zero cash flows from operations, and $100 cash on their balance sheets.

Company A’s inflation of revenues and expenses did not change its reported profits, cash flow from operations, or balance sheet. However, Company A materially overstated both its revenues and expenses. Therefore, Company A’s financial statements "taken as a whole" were "materially misleading."

Green Mountain said that "The effects on certain reported periods are quantitatively significant, and the impact of the individual errors will be disclosed in more detail in the Company’s restated financial statements." However, Green Mountain made no specific mention that its "financial statements taken as a whole" were "materially misstated" or "materially misleading."

Green Mountain should explain its decision to consider the margin error as an "immaterial accounting error"

When Green Mountain issues its restated financial reports, it should provide a thorough analysis and explain to investors why, originally on September 28, 2010, it considered the margin error “immaterial” and initially decided to use a cumulative adjustment to Q4 2010’s financial report to correct that error instead of restating its financial reports.

When the SEC Division of Corporation Finance conducts periodic reviews of public company financial reports and finds accounting errors, it requires the companies to provide a detailed materiality analysis using criteria under SAB No. 99. The analysis is later made publicly available in company filings after the review is completed. At the very least, Green Mountain should provide this analysis to investors when it files its 2010 annual 10-K report.

According to SAB No. 99:

Among the considerations that may well render material a quantitatively small misstatement of a financial statement item are –  

  • whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of precise measurement or whether it arises from an estimate and, if so, the degree of imprecision inherent in the estimate 
  • whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends   
  • whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus expectations for the enterprise   
  • whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa  
  • whether the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant’s business that has been identified as playing a significant role in the registrant’s operations or profitability  
  • whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with regulatory requirements
  • whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with loan covenants or other contractual requirements   
  • whether the misstatement has the effect of increasing management’s compensation – for example, by satisfying requirements for the award of bonuses or other forms of incentive compensation 
  • whether the misstatement involves concealment of an unlawful transaction. 

This is not an exhaustive list of the circumstances that may affect the materiality of a quantitatively small misstatement. Among other factors, the demonstrated volatility of the price of a registrant’s securities in response to certain types of disclosures may provide guidance as to whether investors regard quantitatively small misstatements as material. Consideration of potential market reaction to disclosure of a misstatement is by itself "too blunt an instrument to be depended on" in considering whether a fact is material. When, however, management or the independent auditor expects (based, for example, on a pattern of market performance) that a known misstatement may result in a significant positive or negative market reaction, that expected reaction should be taken into account when considering whether a misstatement is material.

If Green Mountain’s margin error fell under any of the criteria listed above, it should have been considered a material accounting error under SAB No. 99, rather than an "immaterial accounting error" as originally claimed by the company.

Insider sales of stock

In a previous blog post, I detailed how on September 21, 2010, a day after Green Mountain was notified of the SEC inquiry, but seven days before the SEC inquiry was disclosed to investors, executive officer Michelle Stacy exercised 5,000 options and immediately sold her shares at $37 per share. At that time, Michelle Stacy’s Form 4 disclosure did not reflect that she sold her shares pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan. A Rule 10b5-1 trading plan provides certain safe harbors which help executives defend against potential allegations of illegal insider-trading by removing their discretion to decide when their stock is bought or sold.

About five weeks after that blog post, on October 28, 2010, Stacy belatedly filed an amended Form 4 report and disclosed that:

This Form 4 has been amended to note that these sales were affected pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan adopted by Ms. Stacy on 08/13/2010. 

In addition, Michelle Stacy filed another amended Form 4 report to reflect that her September 13, 2010option exercise and sale of stock was also "affected pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan." That option exercise and sale took place just seven days before Green Mountain was notified by the SEC on an inquiry.

At the very least, Michelle Stacy’s filing of amended Form 4 reports displays a continuous pattern of problematic financial reporting by Green Mountain and its officers and which increases investor uncertainty about the integrity of the company’s SEC filings.

Many responsible companies voluntarily disclose their insider’s 10b5-1 trading plans as they are adopted, even though such disclosure is not required under existing SEC rules. The existence of 10b5-1 trading plans are only required to be disclosed on Form 4 as insiders purchase or sell their stock pursuant to such plans. However, voluntary disclosure at the inception of a 10b5-1 trading plan by insiders increases corporate transparency.

On August 13, 2010, Michelle Stacy exercised 30,000 options and immediately sold her shares at $30.95 per share. Not till October 28 did Stacy file amended Form 4 reports to reflect that her September 13th and 21st option exercises and sales of stock were carried out pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan. Stacy claimed that she adopted a 10b5-1 trading plan on August 13. On August 13th, Stacy exercised options and sold stock, but she still does not claim that those transactions were made pursuant to a 10b5-1 trading plan.

If a corporate executive already has nonpublic knowledge of certain adverse events such as undisclosed weaknesses in internal controls, accounting errors, or an SEC inquiry, a 10b5-1 plan cannot provide a safe harbor against illegal insider trading allegations. If it turns out that Michelle Stacy had non-public knowledge of any of those issues affecting Green Mountain before adopting her 10b5-1 trading plan, she could be charged by the SEC with alleged insider trading violations. Several lawsuits seeking class action status have already alleged securities law violations by Green Mountain and its officers.

Usually 10b5-1 trading plans call for the purchase or sale of stock by insiders at regular intervals.  Michelle Stacy’s plan doesn’t appear particularly regular. On Monday, September 13, 2010, she exercised options and sold 5,000 shares of Green Mountain stock. Eight days later on Tuesday, September 21, 2010 (and a day after Green Mountain received notification of the SEC inquiry) she exercised options and sold another 5,000 shares of Green Mountain stock. Forty-five days later, on November 5, 2010, Michelle Stacy exercisedoptions and sold 10,000 shares of Green Mountain stock. In the interest of transparency, Michelle Stacy should explain how the timing of option exercises and sales were determined under her 10b5-1 plan.

PricewaterhouseCoopers

PricewaterhouseCoopers is Green Mountain’s current auditor and it is now evident that it missed a growing list of accounting errors covering fiscal years 2007 to 2010. Likewise, until 2009 PricewaterhouseCoopers was Overstock.com’s (NASDAQ: OSTK) auditors, too. Every single initial financial report issued by Overstock.com from 1999 to 2009 had to be restated at least once and as many as three times due to accounting errors. Therefore, PricewaterhouseCoopers missed accounting errors by Overstock.com in each and every audit it performed of the company.

In 2009, I identified certain violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) which ultimately caused Overstock.com to restate its financial reports for the third time in three years, after the SEC intervened and forced to company to correct its accounting errors. During the ongoing SEC investigation, PricewaterhouseCoopers defended Overstock.com’s improper accounting treatment of cost recoveries from vendors and as it turns out, they were wrong.

Prematurely proclaiming the absence of wrongdoing 

In its November 19, 2010 8-K report, Green Mountain claimed that none of the financial statement errors implicate misconduct with respect to the Company or its management or employees:

The internal investigation is nearly complete, and the Company continues to cooperate fully with the SEC. None of the financial statement errors implicate misconduct with respect to the Company or its management or employees. In addition, none of the financial statement errors are related to the Company’s relationship with M.Block & Sons, the fulfillment vendor through which the Company makes a majority of the at-home orders for the Keurig business unit’s single-cup business sold to retailers. [Bold and italicized emphasis added.]

It is premature for Green Mountain to proclaim the absence of any wrongdoing while the SEC inquiry is still ongoing and it admits that its own internal investigation is not fully completed. The SEC inquiry began on September 20 and has not been concluded. That statement will come back to haunt Green Mountain if the SEC decides to conduct a formal investigation.

In any case, I am naturally suspicious of self-proclaimed absences of wrongdoing without thorough outside independent examination. Back in the old days at Crazy Eddie, we conducted a similar internal inquiry with help from our auditors into certain allegations of wrongdoing involving a supplier and proclaimed ourselves clean. The auditors falsely claimed to both our audit committee and the SEC that they thoroughly checked out those allegations and found no wrongdoing. Management and auditors have little incentive to report their own foul-ups.

Final comment

Every financial report issued by Green Mountain and certified by PricewaterhouseCoopers from 2007 to 2010 had to be restated because of accounting errors. In addition, Green Mountain CEO Lawrence J. Blanford and CFO Frances G. Rathke signed Sarbanes-Oxley certifications covering those reports. So far no one has been held accountable by Green Mountain for its financial misstatements – not its auditors, CFO, or CEO.

While I personally like the smell of Green Mountain’s coffee, I don’t like the smell of its financial disclosures. A little more enthusiasm in cleaning up its financial reporting (like it devotes to cleaning up the environment) and a little more transparency would go a long way.

Written by,

Sam E. Antar (with research assistance from Ilene)

Recommended reading about issues with 10b5-1 trading plans

February 1, 2009: Stanford University Graduate School of Business – Sec Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic Trade by Alan D. Jagolinzer

July 2009: Stanford University Graduate School of Business – Research Underpins SEC Scrutiny of Scheduled Insider Trades by Bill Snyder

Disclosure

I am a convicted felon and a former CPA. As the criminal CFO of Crazy Eddie, I helped my cousin Eddie Antar and other members of his family mastermind one of the largest securities frauds uncovered during the 1980′s. I committed my crimes in cold-blood for fun and profit, and simply because I could.

If it weren’t for the heroic efforts of the FBI, SEC, Postal Inspector’s Office, US Attorney’s Office, and class action plaintiff’s lawyers who investigated, prosecuted, and sued me, I would still be the criminal CFO of Crazy Eddie today.

There is a saying, "It takes one to know one." Today, I work very closely with the FBI, IRS, SEC, Justice Department, and other federal and state law enforcement agencies in training them to identify and catch white-collar criminals. Often, I refer cases to them. I teach about white-collar crime for professional organizations, businesses, and colleges and universities.

Recently, I exposed GAAP violations by Overstock.com which caused the company to restate its financial reports for the third time in three years. The SEC is now investigating Overstock.com and its CEO Patrick Byrne for securities law violations (Details herehere, and here).

I do not seek or want forgiveness for my vicious crimes from my victims. I plan on frying in hell with other white-collar criminals for a very long time.  I do not own any Green Mountain Coffee Roasters or Overstock.com securities long or short. My investigations of those companies is a freebie for securities regulators to get me into heaven, though I doubt I will ever get there. My past sins are unforgivable. 


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