The THAAD Delusion
The story of a missile system placed in a role for which it was never intended illuminates the broader challenges facing the U.S. military.
By Christopher Leonard, The Atlantic
Mohamed bin Zayed was worried about Iran—so worried, in fact, that he decided to gamble with his nation’s future. “We are living in a dangerous neighborhood,” the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and de facto leader of the United Arab Emirates told the top U.S. Air Force general in February 2007. Iran’s effort to acquire nuclear weapons, he said, must be delayed “by all means available.” But MBZ, as the crown prince is known, was acutely aware of what public opposition to the ambitions of its much larger neighbor—and $7 billion trading partner—could cost his tiny state. “I am putting my country at risk and placing myself in a dangerous spot,” he told General Michael Moseley. So he had an urgent request to make of the United States. He wanted a complete multilayered missile shield in place by the summer of 2009, to protect the Emirates against Iranian retribution.
American officials could scarcely conceal their glee. MBZ’s request was the payoff of a year-long campaign to enlist the UAE in their effort to curtail Iran’s nuclear program. They understood that unless the Emirates could defend itself against an Iranian missile barrage, this was unlikely to happen. For a decade, the American weapons manufacturer Raytheon had been trying, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Emiratis to invest in its Patriot air-defense system, but UAE officials were skeptical of its efficacy. However, by 2007, the United States had something new to offer—a system so technologically advanced that it didn’t fully exist yet.
