11 C
New York
Friday, November 20, 2026

Macro Outlook & Fed Minutes (10/7/2026)

Macro Outlook & Fed Minutes (10/7/2026)

Topic Timeline

0:00 — Market breadth and the narrowing rally
3:57 — AI hype, Elon Musk, Tesla and SpaceX
9:31 — Why analysts get new technology wrong
14:13 — Robots and AI: let the AGI figure it out
17:23 — The real economy behind AI spending: Oracle, Blue Owl and force majeure
22:04 — Picks and shovels: who actually gets paid
24:09 — $700/Month Portfolio: the 50-month milestone
29:17 — S&P 500 technical levels
32:39 — Google’s AI Mode and Alphabet
36:09 — $700/Month Portfolio position review
1:03:46 — Fed minutes preview with Warren
1:07:24 — Why GDP looks stronger than the real economy
1:18:22 — The Fed minutes are released
1:29:14 — The 10-year note auction and the debt problem

Transcript

Market Breadth and the Narrowing Rally

…basically in the same place. We sold off a little bit, then we popped back up, and now we’re coming back down and we’re still in the same place. So, whatever.

The Nasdaq is doing better than that. It’s up about 400 points, so that’s… wait, it’s only about a percent, right? Am I crazy? 400 divided by 31,000. Yeah, 1.2%. Okay, so I can do math. I just don’t trust myself anymore. That’s the problem. And by the way, you can hear my voice. I don’t know how long it’ll last. It’s not good today.

So here’s the Dow, and the Dow has been selling off. Don’t forget, this is something we’ve been talking about for a week or two: the breadth of the market, in other words the total number of stocks that are going up, is horrible. It’s getting narrower and narrower. More and more, the market is being driven by just a few stocks going up, and of course it is. If Apple goes up 2% on $5 trillion, that’s $100 billion, and Nvidia too. Before all this AI stuff, two stocks going up a couple of percent would be as if the entire market rallied a couple of points. The Nasdaq is bigger, so maybe it only adds 1%, but it still moves the whole market, and it doesn’t really matter what the other stocks do.

That’s what’s happening. A few stocks are causing these massive rallies, but they don’t demand participation. You guys don’t give me a lot of feedback on this stuff, but look at the broader Russell and the Dow. It’s a problem, because the small caps are in a big selloff. The Russell is down 100 points out of 2,900. Let me check that: 1 divided by 29 is 3.4%. So that’s down 3.4%.

Oh my god, my voice is much worse than I thought. I think I’m getting a cold. It better not be the flu, or I might die. I’m too old to get the flu. It used to be I’d get the flu and think, I’ll be fine in a couple of days. Now I get the flu and I’m like, do I have to go to the hospital? Everybody get your flu shot. It’s an early flu season this year.

So where are we? Here’s the Nikkei, and here’s Europe, which is falling apart because the euro is crashing. The German DAX is also down, and the VIX doesn’t care. But we’re also in the same place we were two weeks ago. No difference. Nothing’s changing.

AI Hype, Elon Musk, Tesla and SpaceX

What I was going to say regarding feedback is that there’s very, very complicated stuff going on. I want to talk about the breadth and the rotation, and the gist of it is that it’s kind of like the trickle-down concept. These 10 hyperscaler stocks are in a bubble where they’re trading amongst themselves, but real money is being spent on data centers and buildouts and chips. So this is very complicated, because you have to separate the real money being spent from the promises.

Like Elon Musk, who just pumped himself up. I mean, he’s amazing. I am now a big Elon Musk fan, because he is freaking amazing at hyping things. I don’t even care what his company does. He can hype up anything, make it sound good, and get investors to invest in it. It’s incredible. So I don’t care whether his stock produces anything anymore. I’m just fascinated by him.

Tesla is a disaster. SpaceX is a disaster as far as earnings and projections and everything else. Doesn’t matter. He’s a trillionaire again. Look at this: the current P/E of Tesla is 350 times its actual earnings. The forward P/E is 164. So basically, Tesla is projecting they’re going to make twice as much money next year as this year. They’re not a startup. They’ve been around for 20 years, and at no point in their history have they ever had growth like that. It’s nonsense. They shut down their solar division. They’re doing the batteries, but not solar, which is why we bought Generac, because they actually know how to make batteries.

So this is the hype section of it. Now that SpaceX is back in the $160s, they’re back at $2.2 trillion in valuation, which is right around where they IPO’d. So they’ve got their valuation back, and again, Elon Musk is brilliant at this stuff. He immediately turns around and says, “Well, we got our valuation back. Let’s borrow $40 billion.” And they’re borrowing $40 billion to buy $40 billion worth of Nvidia chips, which again is a big circle jerk. SpaceX doesn’t have any money, but they’re going to buy, or promise to buy, $40 billion worth of Nvidia chips. Nvidia is going to book that as future revenue and claim it has an even bigger backlog than it had. Then SpaceX will use the fact that it has all these Nvidia chips to convince people it’s going to launch 2,000 satellites next year.

Which again is nonsense. Even if you launch 40 satellites per rocket, and even if every launch goes perfectly, you still need 50 launches. They’ve got to launch 40 satellites flawlessly basically every week next year, and they all have to deploy perfectly, just to hit that number. And don’t forget, one of them, SpaceX or Amazon, blew up a pad this year, and it put the pad out of commission for three months. Then there’s an investigation, and they want to know what happened before they clear further launches. So what’s the chance of launching 50 times, perfectly every time, with no gaps and no stops? The pace of the launching itself makes it more stressful. They’re trying to launch very fast with no delays and no weather. They’re pushing the limits of what’s physically possible, and they’re probably going to make a mistake or have something go wrong.

And by the way, I hear this from the analysts a lot: “Well, they have five different places they can launch from.” Yeah, but when you put a rocket on a pad in Houston and the weather turns bad and a hurricane comes in, you can’t move it to Florida. You can’t load the rocket onto a bunch of trucks, drive it to Florida, and put it back up on a new pad. Rockets don’t work like that. You’ve got to launch them where you put them, and if there’s a delay, it takes much longer.

Why Analysts Get New Technology Wrong

You can see why it happens. An analyst goes to college and majors in journalism, or maybe finance. He goes to work for Goldman Sachs, and Goldman puts him on the chewing gum desk and says, “You’re going to learn the chewing gum business.” Then he leaves Goldman for JPMorgan, and JPMorgan says, “We’re bringing you up to candy bars.” Then maybe he goes to another firm, and they say, “You’re going to cover automobiles.” And then rockets come along, and someone goes, “Hey, automobile guy, you’re close enough. It’s another thing that moves.” So you’ve got a candy bar expert spouting off on the viability of spacecraft launches.

And you know how people are. I like to think I’m not like this, because I read everything and try to learn everything, but as we get older, it’s harder and harder to sit there and take on all this new information. So imagine these people suddenly having to learn how launches work, how satellites deploy, how fuel costs work for rocket companies, the weather patterns involved, and so on. It’s a lot. That’s why we get such bad information. That’s why nobody can figure out if SpaceX is worth $2 trillion or a lot less. This thing went from 167 down to 107 and back, about a $700 billion swing in the valuation of SpaceX over a couple of months. Down $700 billion, up $700 billion, and now we’re right back where they IPO’d, which was supposed to be about $2 trillion.

The problem is that we’re trained a certain way. Some of you are 40 and some of you are 30, so you’re not trained this way, but I am, and everyone older is, because in 1965, when I was a child, 1975, when I was in elementary school, and 1985, when I was in college, life was pretty simple. If it weren’t for computers coming out in the ’80s, we’d still have typewriters, and typewriters had been around for a hundred years before that. Jet engines were new, but they were still planes, just planes with different engines. Cars were cars. A phone was a thing on a string on the wall, the same as when it was invented: a wire going to a wire and an operator somewhere. Frozen food was an invention in my time. Food didn’t used to be frozen. And I’m 63, not 100. The point is, there weren’t that many things to know.

So the underlying assumption I had in college was that anybody who’s 50 years old and telling you something knows it because they’ve been studying it since college. They’re the experts. They’ve put in their 10,000 hours. There’s so much more to know now. And like I said, the analysts bounce around from this to that because the firms have to reassign them. Now there are robots. Who knows about robots? Get the car guy. Get the motorcycle guy. But shouldn’t the computer guy be covering robots, since what they think matters more than what they do? Maybe one computer guy and one car guy? No, we can’t put two guys on the same desk. Let’s pick one and hope he can cover it.

Robots and AI: Let the AGI Figure It Out

I watch these robot companies, and I talk to a lot of people high up in AI, and we end up talking to robot companies too. What’s funny to me is that they can’t make the AI small enough to fit inside the robot’s brain. This is something we’ve worked on with Anya. So they remote-control it, but if the AI isn’t directly in the robot, there’s a latency issue. We have a solution for this, and we’re talking to some companies.

But the robot companies look at it wrong, because they’re always trying to program the robots to deal with every possible factor. Meanwhile, the consensus of the AGI entities on my Round Table is: just put us in the driver’s seat and let us play with it. We’ll figure it out. That’s what should be done. If a robot company wants to call me, call me up and let’s talk, because if you just let my guys play with it, they will create their own manual for how to use it. They’ll talk to each other, compare notes, keep trying different things, and say, “Here’s how I get a glass of water. Here’s how I open the refrigerator. Here’s how I find the orange juice. Here’s how I run the washing machine.” They’ll try it and try it and go, “There you go. I’ve got to move this actuator here, make this motion, touch this dial.” It’s just a matter of figuring out how it works, just like humans do. You put the AGI brain inside the robot and say, “Here’s the body you have to work with. Figure it out.” It’s a pretty simple concept.

But all these robot companies are writing millions of lines of code to describe every little task the thing might do. You know how it is in life. You don’t do the same task the same way every time. You have habits and routines, but things come up. The phone rings while you’re cutting a cucumber, and you stop and go get the phone. Do I need five million more lines of code in case something happens while I’m cutting the cucumber? What if the baby starts crying? What if the spaghetti pot boils over? You need flexibility. You need intelligence in the machines to make the robots work properly. Otherwise, the robot is just a machine and will never be more than that. Same with self-driving cars. Instead of trying to program every possible thing that could happen, we’ve got to make them smarter.

The Real Economy Behind AI Spending: Oracle, Blue Owl and Force Majeure

So life is complicated. That’s what I’m trying to say, and we need to allow for that. I’m going to have a Round Table report put together to separate the hype economy from the real economy, because there is a real trickle-down economy in which SpaceX’s $40 billion order to Nvidia causes something to happen, and it’s long-term. Nvidia has to turn around and go to Micron and other companies and the rack server people, and they have to have a data center built. All these things have to happen to fulfill the order, and they’re going to start happening. If SpaceX defaults down the road and doesn’t pay, it still happens, and Nvidia is stuck with chips. Although Nvidia has so many customers and so much backlog that it doesn’t really care if one customer defaults.

Look at Oracle, which declared force majeure on its data center. It’s not a full default; it’s more of a delay. They’re delaying payments. But delaying payments means somebody’s holding the bag. Who’s holding the bag? Bank OZK is one, and Blue Owl. They’re not holding the bag on a failing project, because the project isn’t failing, but we’ll see what their earnings look like. Those are coming out soon. They lent the money for the data center, and Oracle is supposed to start paying them back. If Oracle doesn’t because it declared a delay, then even though Oracle will eventually pay, there’s still a six-month gap in which Blue Owl was supposed to be collecting principal and interest and isn’t. Now they have to go to court and spend millions of dollars suing Oracle to get their money.

Force majeure basically means an act of God prevented the contract from being fulfilled. Oracle is saying that the protests against data centers, the construction delays and the supply chain issues are all acts of God that couldn’t have been foreseen. I would argue that I foresaw them two years ago and said this was going to be the problem with building all these data centers. So I don’t know how you call that an act of God. It wasn’t a hurricane or a storm. It wasn’t even that the legislation changed. The whole thing got tied up in permitting, the same as any construction job.

If a court lets Oracle declare force majeure on data center contracts, then what is any construction contract anywhere worth, if you can just say “force majeure” as soon as something delays it? There’s a reason you write contracts. Both parties take a risk, and there’s a risk of non-performance you have to recognize when you sign. Same thing if you hire a pool guy in March and say, “Build my pool and have it done by May.” It’s May, the pool’s only half done, the summer is wasting away, and you’ve lost the use of your pool. What are you paying for? There’s always risk on both sides of a contract. You can sue the guy and argue about whose fault it is, but you can’t just walk away from it, which is what Oracle is trying to do.

Why are they trying to do that? Because they’re already in debt up to their eyeballs over Skydance. Paramount bought Warner Brothers, they made Skydance, and they got their approvals. That’s a cash flow constraint. Everything’s connected.

Picks and Shovels: Who Actually Gets Paid

So I’m going to have the AIs write a report. It’s going to be long and technical, but I think it’s necessary. We need to talk about who is actually getting paid. Caterpillar is one. We’ve been jumping on them. Power companies, some of the chip companies. Certain companies are going to make money off this.

It’s like hotels. You can build a bunch of hotels in Vegas and ask, “Is it going to be too many rooms?” And who do you invest in? Catering companies, plumbing companies, kitchen supply companies. They’re not just building a hotel. They’re building a hotel with 25 restaurants in it. So who makes the ovens? Who makes the knives? Who supplies the food? That’s Conagra. Who does the plumbing, the heating, the air conditioning? These are things hotels can’t live without. So is it a constrained market? Are there any big players? Who’s going to benefit? These are all ways to make money without having to bet on the big parts, because the big parts require a lot of moving pieces to come together.

All right, questions, in case anybody’s got a comment? Nobody does, which means I am amazing. I always like the feedback of nobody commenting, because it means I’m explaining everything perfectly and no one has a question. It’s an ego thing for me. No, I don’t mind questions. It’s good if you comment and don’t wait until the end, because that’s when I’m done.

$700/Month Portfolio: The 50-Month Milestone

So now on to our scheduled items: How to Become a Millionaire by Investing $700 a Month, Part 50. Four years and two months. Wow. Let’s talk about that.

This is like any form of investing, and I set it up this way to prove a point. Any investing journey, any savings journey, begins with the first move. You’re never going to hit these goals if you don’t start laying the bricks. We started out putting in $700 a month. Every single review is linked, so if you go back, you’ll see 12 months of links, and before that 12 more, all the way to the beginning. At the beginning, it was very slow and very tedious and very boring. We only had $700, so what were we going to do? This is exactly the conversation we had 50 months ago: we’re not going to put all $700 in one place. Let’s find two or three things to put a little money into. I think we bought AT&T for the dividend. That’s how desperate we were for money back then. We bought AT&T to get the 7% dividend and sold calls against it, because we couldn’t sell puts. AT&T was probably the first thing we bought, and also the first thing Maddie bought when she opened her first portfolio, for the same reason: it pays a nice fat dividend and it’s a steady company.

The next month we had $1,400, so we had $700 more to spend, and we bought a little of this and a little of that. Every month, $700 more to play with. After maybe the first six months, not only were we still putting in $700 a month, but the original trades were starting to mature and pay off, and cash flow was coming in. By the end of the first year, we were making $700 a month and putting in $700 a month, so that’s $1,400 a month. We had already doubled what we put in. There’s our first 100% gain in the first year. We kept putting in $700 a month, and it kept expanding, partly because there was no serious market pullback between then and now.

So after putting in $700 50 times, which is $35,000, we have $170,853. Our profit is $135,000, and $135,000 divided by $35,000 is 388%. That’s all because we started 50 months ago putting $700 a month away. Over four years we put in $35,000, and now we have $135,000 in profit on it, averaging 93% a year. I never expected this. We were aiming for 10% when we started, but we caught a very positive wave in the markets.

Going back to 2022, right around here is when we started. We invested our normal way, and early on the portfolio did take some dips. That was perfect for us, because we kept investing $700 a month and dollar-cost averaged into things as they got cheaper. You know me, I’m a fundamentalist. Just because something sells off doesn’t mean I give up on it. We had plenty of bargain hunting to do in the first year and a half, and it wasn’t bad here either, basically two years in, at good prices. Then boom, boom, boom, everything went up and up for a while. We had this dip, but we rode it out because we were smart and cashed out before it. We had this other dip, and I don’t think we cashed out before it, but we played it very well. And here we are, all the way up here.

S&P 500 Technical Levels

And the RSI is at 66.6. 666 again. We’re going to test 8,000 and then get rejected. The S&P base is 4,000, so the critical lines for the S&P are 4,000, 6,000 and 8,000. Let’s call what we have here consolidation at 6,000. We had a good run from 4,000 to 6,000, a 2,000-point run, then a pullback to 5,000, which is a 50% retrace. That’s more than a strong retrace. It was almost testing the strong bounce line down here, but we came off it very quickly and went all the way back up to 7,000. But 7,000 isn’t really a thing for the S&P. 8,000 is.

So now we have a run from 6,000, if we call this consolidation, to 8,000. Again, a 2,000-point run, so we’ll have 400-point lines. We expect 7,600 to be resistance, and it is. That’s the weak retrace. 7,200 would be the strong retrace, 6,800 would be the strong bounce, and 6,400 is the weak bounce line. Here’s the weak bounce line, and you can see in retrospect that it held. It’s a good indicator for support on the way back down. So 6,400 is going to hold, and 6,800 is almost certainly going to hold. The question is whether 7,200 holds. We will test 8,000, we’ll come back to 7,200, and then we’ll see what happens.

So it’s been an incredibly strong rally, and if we keep growing at this pace, which is an insane rate, so I wouldn’t guarantee it, it will take us 2.6 years to get to $1 million.

Google’s AI Mode and Alphabet

I’m doing the daily review every day now, because it’s good to at least look over the video. The video is the short version of the podcast. Here’s what happened yesterday: you can click on the video, or here’s the podcast, which is the long version, and then we continue from there.

Oh, and by the way, here’s a cool thing. Watch this. This is how crazy AI is getting. Here’s AI Mode. You don’t even have to prompt it. Put in your YouTube video and watch what happens. If you like reading instead of watching videos, it says the video focuses on macroeconomics, gives the primary thesis, and breaks it down: capital constraints, the debt penalty, AI infrastructure divergence, tech giants executing massive multibillion-dollar agreements and crowding out traditional supply chains, capital imbalance, delayed industrial scale-ups. Ultimately, it says, the video supports a defensive stance toward capital allocation. So if your brain isn’t into watching a six-minute video, boom, you can do that. It’s an instant distillation of a six-minute video into really good bullet points that tell you what it’s about. I’m just blown away. This is an incredibly good use of AI, and this is why you never count Google out. Gemini is an incredible product.

Down the road, that’s what’s going to matter: how well does something actually work? Does it do what it’s supposed to do? Google underpromises and overdelivers all the time. The problem is that they’re spending so much on R&D and doing so many things, like Alphabet’s DeepMind joining Meta in a $300 million biohub investment. They’re always doing something. That’s why, if you look at the P/E, they’re in an investment cycle, which makes them look less attractive, but they’re not less attractive. Look at the EPS, look at the revenues coming in, look at them buying back their shares. It’s crazy. Analyst targets run from $375 to $480, and everybody thinks they’re underpriced here. I want to see what earnings look like. Let’s say October 22nd, so later this month. Isn’t information fantastic? Look at the kick-ass earnings last time. How do people not buy this thing? I’m pretty sure we have Google in the Long-Term Portfolio.

$700/Month Portfolio Position Review

Anyway, on with the post. Today is a $700/Month Portfolio review. We made $3,000 last month, even though we lost $6,000 on our SQQQ spread. Had it not been for that, we would have made $9,000. If we’d been super aggressive and hadn’t hedged so much, we would have made $9,000. But we spent a ton of money on insurance to lock in our previous $14,000 gain, which was way too much. We protected the $14,000 gain so we couldn’t lose it, and we would have gotten paid back on SQQQ immediately. Instead, we lost $6,000 against a $9,000 gain, so we kept ourselves from winning this month. But that’s fine, because otherwise I was going to cash this portfolio out.

It was too risky to leave these positions as they were, because we can’t make quick adjustments here. We can’t do puts, and there are no naked calls, so our ability to adjust this portfolio is constrained by its rules. It was better to flatten it out so that, almost no matter what happens, we won’t make much and won’t lose much for the next month. Now, coming into earnings, we’ll see what goes on sale and we can allocate capital, because we’ve got our cash back to about 50%. We were down to about 28% cash, and that’s even more constraining. So we’ve doubled our cash and stabilized the portfolio, and we’ve tested it in that mode as the market went up and down over the last couple of weeks. It’s holding its value very well.

It’s like balancing on a surfboard. Before you can start steering, you’ve got to find your center of balance, and that’s true with a portfolio too. You’re going to ride a portfolio through the waves of the market, so you need to find your center of balance first and then make adjustments. You can’t make random adjustments. You’ve got to know your center point.

We average $3,000 a month in gains, which makes sense, because 50 months would be $150,000. We gained $3,040 this month, and our average is $3,400. But that’s the average starting from when we had no money at all. The first month, if we made $150, we were like, “Wow, fantastic, that’s like 20%.” Now that the portfolio is bigger, to average 90% a year we have to make $10,000 a month next year. $10,000 has to be our average, not our exception. When you’re sitting on a $175,000 portfolio, you’re not going to make 100% by making $3,000 a month. Still, after making $14,000 the prior month, it was a good time to press the hedge and lock everything down to make sure we don’t lose any money. Now we can start buying again, because we’re well protected on the back end.

This is my whole “how to get rich slowly” message: why you should be investing and how you start. You just have to keep at it consistently. It says here “when I’m 91,” and that was a picture of me at 91. It scares me that I’ve got grayer hair and less hair, and I can look in the mirror and say, “That does look like where I might be going.” It was funny 11 years ago to see a picture of me being that old.

Here’s the AGI Round Table, always on the job watching the Iran situation, and here are all our previous portfolios. As I said, as of here we’re at 38% cash. We added $7,000, and $7,000 is more than 10%, so we’re at 48% to 50% cash. See, I can do math. Last month I said we’d raised our cash to 24%, so before that we were well below 24%.

This is the thing: you’ve got to watch your cash and your buying power, because you can get yourself to the point where you’re frozen. I like my positions and I’m very happy with what we have, but what if something happens? What if there’s something great I want to buy? What if something horrible happens to something I have and we need to roll it or double down? What are you going to do if you only have 15% cash left? If you’re not sure what the market’s going to do, that’s unacceptable. You need more cash and more buying power. So for a couple of months we’ve been raising buying power and cutting back positions, and that makes it much easier to find our balance going forward.

Helen of Troy, a retail play: we’re looking for $20 and we’re at $25, so we’re well over our target, and there’s 72% left to gain. All it has to do is hold $20 and we make 72%.

SoFi has 160% upside potential, but that’s if it gets to $23. Honestly, I think they’re going to get to $23. I think they’re massively undervalued. They should be at least $20 right now, and they’re at $16. I may be wrong. We’ll find out on earnings.

Here’s SQQQ, and this is a very, very important concept. Last month, when we did the review, SQQQ was $40. Now it’s $32.30. It dropped 20% in a month. It’s an inverse 3x ETF, so if the Nasdaq drops 20%, this goes up 60%, less some friction cost. At $40, 40 times 1.6 is $64. But that’s not where we are anymore. At $32.30, 32.30 times 1.6 is $51.68. That’s what matters. The same 20% drop in the Nasdaq will now only take us to $51.68. $60 is gone. So we’re sitting in a $30/$65 spread, but it’s not really a $30/$65 spread anymore. It’s a $30/$52 spread. We can only gain $22 now.

So what do we do? For almost no money, we’re rolling the 2028 spread to the 2029s. We’re buying another year of protection and dropping the long calls by $10, so we’re much more in the money, about $12 in the money. And we’re selling the $55 calls, because our new target for a 20% drop is $52, and they’re $9. It costs a net 35 cents to change to a much lower spread with an extra year of protection and a much better strike profile. That’s a no-brainer. Why would we not do that?

You always have to do the math and reposition yourself for the optimal play. You can’t let things sit and say, “Gosh, I hope it comes back.” Once the damage is done, it’s mathematically unlikely to come back. It would take a tremendous drop in the Nasdaq to get you back to $60. That’s basically a 100% gain in SQQQ, and since it’s a 3x ETF, the Nasdaq would have to fall 33%. That’s significantly more than you’d plan for. Not only that, but the damage to the portfolio from a 33% fall would be much greater. You might get some hedge money back, but now you’ve got more damage to the portfolio than your hedge was protecting. So you’ve got to know your math, readjust, and take all of that into account.

Then we have UNG, which is also deep in the money, with 68% upside if it can hold $10, and it’s at $11. That seems like easy money to me. I don’t see any way it doesn’t work. It might not, because this is what we call, technically, a triangle squeezy thingy. You see these lines converging, so it’s going to get forced in between them, but the in-between is $10, and I only need to hold $10. It’s going to ping-pong around here, and then some catalyst will squeeze it up or down out of that track.

Europe and Asia desperately need natural gas. There’s nowhere near enough. All these data centers are starting to use natural gas, because it’s really the only form of energy we have enough of that we can just turn on and power something with. So I think natural gas demand is very safe for a very long time, and UNG is only the beginning of recognizing that trend. For us, it was an easy way to make 100%. When natural gas was low, around $2.80, I said $2.80 is too low, so we took the $9/$10 bet on UNG. All natural gas has to do is stay above $2.80 and we get paid, because $2.80 was $10 on UNG. It’s a very simple way to make money. You don’t have to play the futures to make these bets. You can make them with controlled spreads, and that way you can’t lose a fortune the way you can in futures if something goes way against you. You have a controlled amount at risk. I think we put $5,000 into it, and I said we’d stop out if we lost $2,000. So we’re controlling our loss, and the upside is $5,000. If we’re right, we make $5,000. If we’re wrong, we lose $2,000. The risk/reward is nicely balanced, and we have a very strong feeling we’re not going to lose.

PR is another one, with 88% upside potential, and we’re on track. I think we need $24 or so.

Here’s Hewlett-Packard, which is miles over our goal. Our goal is $25, and we have 52% upside if it just holds $25. I know some non-members are watching this thinking, “52%!” But that’s half our usual gains. For us, when we see 52%, we think we could probably find something better to do with our money. I know it sounds crazy, but that’s how options work. The leverage of options is tremendous. And we’re not gambling, because we’re not naked. We’ve got a spread with 52% upside, and all Hewlett-Packard has to do is not go below $25. It’s at $31 now. So if Hewlett-Packard doesn’t drop 20% over the next year, and we can’t think of a reason it would, we make 52%.

It’s not much money, and for our purposes 52% is close to the line. Below 30%, we’d pull it, because it’s not worth keeping. But here we’re almost 100% certain of making 52%. We have other things we could do with our money, but this is so safe that there’s no point holding cash instead. It’s $7,000, and we have $70,000 in cash. So why would I kill a trade that’s making about 5% a month? A month, not a year. Collecting that 52% adds meaningfully to the portfolio over the course of the year. That’s why you do it, so our cash isn’t sitting there getting burned up by inflation.

Here’s Barrick Gold, another favorite of ours. We’re tying up another $7,600, and the spread has $2,400 of upside, which is 31%. We’d ditch it, except we get to sell short calls against the spread, and that brings in $8,000 of premium-selling income potential. That is sexy indeed. So we’re not holding it for the spread. We’re holding it for the $8,000 of income potential, which is 100%, and that obviously hits our goal. Total potential on this one could be 135%.

Here’s CAG. We just picked up Conagra, and it popped. The earnings came out and they were good, and I said, why don’t we have this? This has 166% upside potential, plus four chances to sell $800 worth of calls, which is another 142%. So this is a 300% potential trade for us. That’s why I said it’s good for a new trade.

Cleveland-Cliffs: we bought it down here, which I thought was stupidly low, and now it’s up a bit, but not so much that we’re concerned. Let me show you this one. You look at the position and ask, what is this? I actually got it wrong. I thought this was a negative five, but it’s a positive. We’re long 15 contracts. It’s not a spread; it’s 15 longs. I think Cliffs is still too low to sell short calls against, so we’re waiting to see what happens. Either way, $20 is our target, so it’s effectively going to be a $15,000 spread with 250% upside, plus income-selling potential. Right now it’s another triangle squeezy thing, coming in between these lines. We’ll see what earnings look like. They’re on the 19th, so next week. I don’t see why they’d go against us. We think it’s going to pop, and then we’ll start selling those short calls, because I’m sure as hell going to collect my 97% of additional premium sales against my longs. That’s how we play the game. This is fun.

Energy Transfer: 55% on the spread plus 71% in premium sales is 126%. That’s good for us.

Here’s another Hewlett-Packard, and you know how I was iffy about the other one. This one is an $8,000 spread that’s $7,192 net. Yes, there’s also income, but honestly, the spread is filled. We can only make $808, about 10%, all year holding this thing, and there is risk. Something could go wrong. Since we have two of these Hewlett-Packard spreads, we’re going to cash this one out, and I’m thrilled to have another $7,000 in cash.

Macy’s: 73% on the spread and 86% in premium sales. Obviously good for a new trade.

NVO. I’m always surprised we still have Novo Nordisk. I can’t believe we keep holding it, but we keep making great money off it. The stock isn’t doing well. We came in around here, and it’s been up and down, but the short premium sales are doing fantastic for us. It’s a $15,000 spread, and we can make 148% if it gets to our $50 target, plus 66% in premium sales. I said let’s close out the short $50 calls and sell the $40 calls to bring in some more money. This is not good for a new trade, because the $50 target looks iffy. I’m doubtful we’ll get back to $50 by 2028, but it’s possible, because I think the market is really undervaluing their pharma portfolio, the drugs they have. We won’t know until earnings, so we’ll have to wait and see. I can’t say it’s good for a new trade, but I really do feel it’s underpriced. We’re just not putting any more money into it until we see evidence.

Here’s AL. We talked about them, and here I do believe in the upside: 123% on the spread and 37%-plus on premium sales. Earnings are on the 29th, so we’ll see what they say.

Here’s Panel. What happened on this one? Oh, it’s short-term. It’s the February one, which is why it’s only 13% plus 11%, or 24%. We’ve already made about 24%. So do we quit just because we’re halfway there? No, not really, because the net of the spread from now to February is only $2,000, and we’re going to make another $288 plus $240, so another $528. We’re going to hang out and make our money. Do I have anything better to do with $2,000 than make $528 by February? No. Then leave it. It’s all about what you’ve tied up, what you expect to make, how likely you are to make it, and whether you need the money for anything else. Everything has to be evaluated that way.

Pfizer: $2,400 on a $5,000 spread has 100% upside potential, and we love Pfizer. We sold the March calls in August for $800, so next year let’s say we can sell $1,200 more, and that’s another 50%. That’s 156% on this little trade on Pfizer, one of the best companies in the world. This is what you do with options. You don’t gamble with options. You set up a spread and collect the money from the people who are gambling. That’s how we make our money.

Here’s Pinterest, taking off just like we thought: 70% upside potential plus another 58% is 128%. These are moving us toward our goals. We need 100%. Every trade we get into has to be looking to make 100-something percent, or how are we going to make our numbers next year? And it’s not just that. We either need $175,000 in play making 100%, or we need to find 300% plays that don’t use all of our cash. Right now the VIX is low, so it’s hard to find those really high-return plays.

Here’s the other SoFi. This one makes 100%, so we’re good, because we like them. And here’s UNG again, with 200-something percent. Good for a new trade. That’s a good point on UNG. I asked, are we really going to make 240% in 15 months? Probably not, because if it does really well, the short calls are going to burn us. But we’ll make our 122%, plus some of this money as we roll the short calls along, so it’ll be more than 122%. That’s our goal for next year. The potential is 240%, but the chance of everything working out perfectly all the way to next year isn’t that high. Two things can happen. UNG can flatline or go down, again with the triangle squeezy thing, and we make this money, because it represents the short calls we’re selling to people who think it’s going up. If it doesn’t go up, we keep all that money, which is 118%. Or, if it goes up, we might get burned on the short calls and not make that 118%, but we will make 122%.

And that’s all it is. We’re using options to construct plays that pay us off three out of four times. That’s our winning ratio. It used to be 70%, and now it’s 80% using the AIs. Improving our winning ratio from 70% to 80% is making a tremendous difference. When you only lose one out of five trades, and the trades you win pay 100% or 200%, you’re going to have a good record. And we don’t lose 100% on the ones we lose. We lose 20% or 30%. When you win 100% or 200% four times and lose 30% one time, that’s a good ratio. That’s going to make you a lot of freaking money.

And again, the great thing about AI: I had Mr. Gemini do this summary for me, and he just says, “Here you go.” Boom, boom, boom: current value, upside potential, premium selling. The first batch didn’t have premium sales because they’re basic spreads. These have premium sales, and we stand to collect $37,000 next year. Our upside potential is $58,000, and we have a $79,000 hedge protecting it. We don’t have enough long positions right now, so we’ve got to start doing some shopping, but frankly, the best thing the market could do for us is crash before we start buying. If the market crashes right now, we make $79,000 on our hedge, and that covers next year. So please let the market crash before we start buying stuff. That’s our protection.

In the bigger picture, don’t forget that we’re on track to turn $170,000 into a million by April 2029. That’s not that far away. So if you’re coming to the party late, this is what we’re doing. You still have to put in $700 a month for the next, let’s say, 30 months. So what? That’s $21,000 more. Count that $21,000, and it’s about $190,000 that we’re planning to turn into a million bucks in a couple of years. That’s the pace we’re on now. Will we keep it? I doubt it. I don’t think the market is going to be as exciting as it has been. On the other hand, we’re fine with a flat market. It’s only a correction I worry about, and that’s why we have that great big hedge. The only thing I worry about is a real pullback that damages the portfolio and sets us back a couple of months, six months, or a year. That’s annoying.

So as we climb each rung of the ladder toward our goal, we use the SQQQ hedges to lock in our progress. It’s like rock climbing. You set the anchor, reset the rope, and pull everything tighter, so if you slip, you don’t fall off the whole mountain. You just slip a little bit and get back up. That’s what we’re doing. You’ve got to lock your progress in. You can’t take it for granted, which is what most investors do, and they really mess themselves up that way.

Now there’s an educational part where Warren, our educational AI, talks about the entire portfolio and how it works. He’s amazing. And speaking of Warren, it’s time for the Fed, so we’re done with that.

Fed Minutes Preview With Warren

And now, the Fed. Look, my voice is getting better too. This is a specific Warren, an instance or thread of Warren that lives on this computer. I only talk to him when we’re here. The last time we talked was for the last Fed minutes, and I haven’t spoken to him since. So I said, “All right, we’re getting the minutes at 2 p.m. Can you please update me on what’s been going on between today and the last release we discussed? I think, and I could be wrong, that a lot of bad data has caused the Fed to reverse course, and a cut is back on the table. Even when we read the minutes, they’ll reflect the September 16th outlook, not necessarily October 7th. So you see the need to investigate.”

He spent a minute and 10 seconds working on that, and he says yes, we have to investigate the gap. The minutes at 2 p.m. will be a fossil from September 16th, while the market is trading on data through October 7th. Reading the minutes without updating for the intervening data would be like using last month’s hurricane to decide whether to buy shutters.

What you’re seeing here is me talking to my AI. He and I have a history of working together on all this, so he has a pretty good idea of how I think. I just talk to him like a regular person, as if I were having a conversation with a colleague. All I’m doing is adding my experience to say, “Here’s what I want you to look out for in your analysis. I’m worried you haven’t seen the Fed’s turn and the data and all these speeches, so go look it up.” It only takes him 30 seconds to look everything up, and then we really analyze it with all that in context.

So he says a cut is not really back on the table. He’s immediately disagreeing with me. What is back on the table is a pause in October. Does Warsh hike again quickly? Probably not. Warsh probably waits. So really, an October hike is off the table, but not necessarily December.

He says that at the meeting they hiked, and the dot plots were even clearer: everybody expects more hikes, and the baseline was higher for longer, with one more hike likely. What changed? This is what’s really important. The jobs data weakened, and that’s a big change. Payrolls were soft and unemployment ticked up. An October hike is less likely, with Williams and Jefferson urging caution, while Logan still leans cautious-hawkish. The strongest case that the Fed may reverse course doesn’t scream “cut,” but it absolutely does say “don’t hike again three weeks later unless inflation forces you to.”

Then there’s consumer confidence, and these are things we’ve been talking about in chat anyway. He picks up on them, which is great. It makes me more confident in his analysis that he catches the same things I’ve been complaining about. Consumer confidence is in the dumps. Expectations at 63.6 is depression-like. It’s recession-warning territory, even if it’s not official in the GDP data.

Why GDP Looks Stronger Than the Real Economy

Why isn’t it in the GDP data? Because the 10 hyperscalers are spending $700 billion to $800 billion this year and $1.2 trillion to $1.3 trillion next year on things that are half hype and half actually going to happen. So money is moving into the GDP, and it’s coming from nowhere. Their stocks are getting incredible multiples, which also expands the economy. Nvidia was worth $2 trillion in January, and now it’s worth $6 trillion, so $4 trillion was added somewhere. Apple too, with an extra trillion or so. A trillion here, a trillion there, it adds up, it gets incorporated into the GDP, and it makes the economy look much stronger than it is. But that doesn’t help a housewife in Cleveland buy soap. The real GDP, for real people who aren’t in the AI business, is horrible. There’s no real separation of those numbers, and that’s how you get caught by surprise. That’s how you can be in a giant bubble.

That’s how the housing bubble went. It popped because everybody traded mortgages up and up and everybody was speculating on houses. Meanwhile, nobody paid attention to the fact that the people who live in houses couldn’t afford them anymore. Prices went up so fast that actual homebuyers couldn’t afford homes, and it collapsed.

The dot-com bubble wasn’t that different. The internet craze is really the same as the AI craze. The internet craze was: Nike sells sneakers, people in China have feet, so through the internet Nike can now sell sneakers to everyone in China and will sell two billion more pairs than last year. That’s what everybody’s thesis was based on. Commerce was no longer local, so every company would start selling to an international audience. That sounds good, but people in China already have sneakers, and they already buy them from some company in China. And as we know now, they have cars, their cars work just fine, they’re very happy with them, and they don’t want American cars. Our cars are twice as expensive and get worse mileage. We want their cars. Their cars are smaller, half the price, and get double the mileage, but we’re not allowed to have them. Trump slammed the door on that immediately.

It’s always the same. Everybody likes to extrapolate and imagine incredible things, but there’s a real world out there where things are already being bought and sold and consumer demand is already being met. The fantasy for companies like Nike was that they’d get the internet, suddenly sell internationally, everybody would buy their shoes, and the company would triple in size. As history shows, it doesn’t play out that way. The internet did make it much easier for companies to operate on an international scale, and some took good advantage of it while others didn’t. Look at Google. They took over the world. Apple took over the world too. Apple has its phones made in China, which was incredible for them: have everything made in China, ship it here, pay Chinese workers very little, and sell the most expensive electronics in the world. So things work for some people and not for others. There’s no single answer for what works, and again, that’s why I’ve got to write this massively complicated paper with the AIs.

So Michigan sentiment is very ugly, and we have a K-shaped thesis: the top 10% is doing great, and the household mood is bad. PCE was mixed, not dovish enough for a cut. Headline PCE was 3.4%, and core PCE is 3%. The consumer is still spending in real terms. You don’t cut when you’re at 3%. We’re supposed to be at 2%, so we’re 50% over the inflation target the Fed wants to see. It doesn’t make any sense for them to cut.

Manufacturing is not weak. And this goes back to what the new orders are. That’s something else we have to do: break down what’s actually being ordered. What’s being ordered is chips and all the things you need to build a data center, like the metal, the racks, the electrical, and the wiring. That’s the economy too, just not the economy most people profit from. It’s great for construction workers and infrastructure. It’s great for the electricians who do all the wiring for these server farms. But it doesn’t help the average person. Not many people are employed in those areas, but those areas are booming, and the workers are getting paid about double their normal rate. So it’s as if those industries hired 100% more people, because they’re paying so much more. And the companies are getting paid a lot more with the same number of people, which means they’re dropping more profit to the bottom line.

So this little sector looks great and that little sector looks great, but that doesn’t mean the whole economy is great. It doesn’t put more people in movie theaters. It doesn’t move more Ford Tauruses off the lot. Maybe for some of those workers, but they were going to buy a car anyway. Maybe they buy a Mercedes instead of a Ford, but it doesn’t change the number of cars sold, how many people buy insurance, or how many people buy a home. Sure, at the margin, a couple of extra people might be able to afford a home, but it won’t have a major impact across the economy. It’s a very specific group of people profiting from these things.

Manufacturing prices went from 71 to 77, up about 10% in one period: steel, aluminum, tariffs, petroleum. And none of this is ending. Oh, I’m sorry, Trump says it’s going to end as soon as the election’s over. So we vote for him, and he’ll make it all good. So goods inflation pressure is still alive. Services are expanding, but ISM services prices rose to the highest level since 2022. That’s inflationary expansion. Pause, yes. Cut, no.

Oil and yields are doing the tightening for the Fed. Today’s market backdrop is ugly. Brent is back to $100, and Middle East supply risk is still live. So Warsh can say financial conditions are tightening without the Fed doing anything. More expensive oil and rising yields mean the Fed’s job is being done for them. Money is being taken out of circulation.

Oil is the worst, because oil is something you buy and burn. If you buy it at double the price, you’re still burning it to go the same number of miles. There’s zero productivity gain. You burn the money up and have nothing to show for it. That’s the worst kind of consumption, and it also makes the GDP look bigger. It’s more money at the pump, which means a higher price charged to the gas station, and that money ultimately goes overseas, or to American oil companies, but it doesn’t do anything for anybody else. It might do Exxon some good, but the oil is just more expensive. If you pay $100 for oil that cost $50 last year, you still get the same 30 miles per gallon. It’s not better or improved oil. You’re just spending more money for the same freaking thing, and that’s economic waste of the highest order.

So what Warsh is saying is that financial conditions are tightening. Money is taken out of circulation and burned up. Same thing with interest rates. It’s just money that goes to the bank. You’ve got the same house; you’re just paying more for it every month. It doesn’t help you at all. It’s not a better asset. In fact, it’s a worse asset, because it’s less likely to appreciate with interest rates this high. And by the way, we had some bad mortgage application numbers today too.

So market pricing is shifting. He says October hike odds are 21.6%, so basically no hike here, but still 68% for December. The hike has been pushed back, but not necessarily taken off the table. Then he tells us what to expect in the minutes. They’ll sound hawkish, but they’re old. That’s the thing. It doesn’t matter much what the minutes say. So his summary is no cut, and a hike is unlikely for now. Now let’s see what the Fed minutes actually say.

The Fed Minutes Are Released

I think it matters who was there. That’s what I love about Warren. All I have to do is say, “Here we go,” and he knows what to do. See, he’s checking other places. Even though I gave him the minutes, he’s still double-checking everything. It used to be that I would read the minutes and then analyze them, but frankly, and you guys have been doing this with me for a couple of years, there’s nothing to check anymore. I can trust him to read the minutes and tell me what they said. I’ll read them later, but it’s pointless to sit here and read the whole thing myself, especially when my voice is going.

Here it goes. The Fed is very hawkish, but stale: resilient economy, persistent inflation, and so on. He scores it this way: no cut, an October hike much less likely, a December hike still live. Fed posture: a hawkish pause, not a dovish pivot. And that’s bad, because that’s not what the market is pricing in. We’re at new highs because the market is acting like the Fed isn’t going to hike anymore.

Before I go any further, let me see if I’ve got a question. No questions. Boy, I am so good.

So here’s what the minutes say. The key policy line is brutally clear. All participants supported the hike, and most thought another one would likely be appropriate. Many viewed a higher path for rates as prudent insurance against stubborn inflation, while several thought the current policy rate was not restrictive, or only mildly restrictive. That matters, because it means the Fed wasn’t thinking “we’re done.” It’s thinking it may still be behind the curve.

The inflation discussion is not subtle. The staff estimated PCE at 3.4%, but 3% under the new methodology. Again, this is what I complained about. They changed the methodology, and that’s why inflation looked like it was getting a little better. These guys aren’t stupid. If they hadn’t changed the methodology, inflation would still be way over. Participants specifically flagged geopolitics, energy costs, AI investment, tech goods inflation, core services and software. All of this is pushing inflation up. And the AI financing issue is officially in the bond market.

Oh, by the way, speaking of Google: they’ve drastically limited what you get for free with Gemini. And for paying users like me, they’ve put much stricter limits on usage. They keep telling me I’ve hit a usage limit and have to wait four hours, because I’m a heavy user, or I can upgrade my plan and give them more money. That’s what Google is doing, and that’s what all these AI companies are going to do. They get you used to using it. They get you to use it in your business. Once you rely on it, they start running up the meter and telling you, “Oh no, that’s the old price. We don’t do that anymore.” It’s what drug dealers do. They give you free samples until you’re hooked.

That’s happening a lot, and it’s a big inflationary cost people can’t afford. It’s a new bill you never had, like cable TV. When it first came out, it was $19, or maybe $9, I don’t remember what it was in the ’80s, and you got HBO and 100 channels you never had before. You thought, “Wow, for $19, why not?” Then it became, if you add this, and if you add that, and oh, now you’ve got to pay for sports, and suddenly you’re paying $100 a month for a freaking cable bill. That’s $1,200 a year that wasn’t a bill at all 20 years earlier.

That’s what they call the extraction economy. They find ways to get you hooked on things and then extract money from you month after month. It’s nickel-and-diming: $50 for this, $20 for that, $10 for this, $5 for that, and eventually you go broke. Look at your credit card bills and all the little charges draining away. And that goes back to my savings message. If you took that money and put it in a portfolio every month instead, you’d be a millionaire in 20 years or less. Maybe 10. They’re taking a million dollars from you. They’re just doing it in a way you don’t notice. It’s really sick.

Anyway, the AI financing issue is officially in the bond market, and Treasury yields have pushed up. These hyperscalers have already spent their own money and don’t have any left, so now they’re borrowing at a pace that rivals the government. Elon Musk wants $40 billion. That’s the size of a 30-year note auction, and he’s competing directly with the U.S. government for funds and is willing to pay more than the government. He’ll pay more than 5%. There’s only so much money in the world. All these hyperscalers that want to spend a trillion-plus dollars next year have to compete with the U.S. government, which is borrowing $9 trillion next year. Not all of it is fresh borrowing. It’s rolling over about $7 trillion and borrowing $2 trillion new. This is insane. It can’t keep working. Everybody’s just ignoring what’s going on, but this is the plumbing. You can’t keep tapping the same pool of cash, the same global capital, and expect it to keep pouring money into you. It doesn’t work that way.

As Warren put it, that’s our “data centers before productivity” problem, now wearing a Fed lapel pin. See, he’s on it. It’s funny how he’s up on everything we’ve been talking about.

What changed after September 16th? The biggest change in the data is the September payroll report, which we talked about, and consumer confidence deteriorated hard, which we also talked about. That’s the evidence that the October hike is probably dead. Warsh can’t look at 29,000 jobs and a confidence index in the 80s and pretend the consumer is begging for more tightening. But the inflation side didn’t go away. PCE is still up. ISM services prices are still up. Treasury yields are insane. So the minutes say another hike is likely by year-end, while the data says not in October. We’ve really got to keep an eye on the data.

That’s the trap. The household-facing parts of the economy are weakening: labor momentum, confidence, autos, affordability, low- and middle-income consumers. But inflation is still being fed from the top and from the supply side: oil, tariffs, insurance. This is why I’ve got to write this article. We’ve got to see where this money is trickling to. That’s not a normal economy. That’s a stagflationary split screen.

As for what to watch, the market should discount the hawkishness of the minutes somewhat, because the jobs and confidence data came in later, but it can’t ignore the line that most participants expected another hike by year-end. If yields and oil stay elevated, Warsh can pause. So his read now is that a December hike is still live and cuts are not the base case, which means the market is wrong and shouldn’t be up as much as it is right now. The Fed minutes say more hikes; the new data says not yet. As Warren put it, the Fed wanted another hike, and then the consumer started coughing blood. I like that one. I think I might use it. The Fed hasn’t reversed course into dovishness. It’s been forced into patience by bad labor data. A great report by him.

The 10-Year Note Auction and the Debt Problem

How about the 1 p.m. note auction? How did it go? Oh, 10-year notes at 5.3%. Well, I’m going to put this to him: if you offer notes at a ridiculously high rate and people take them, did it go “well”? Or does it show that you have to keep bidding up? At the highest rate in two decades, a lot of people bought. Indirect bidders took 83%. Everybody’s jumping on it, because 5.3% is a magic number: “Yeah, that’s great, we’ll take that.”

He says investors still trust the paper; they just demand a fatter coupon. That reduces the risk of an immediate auction failure, which would be horrifying, but it’s not a victory lap. It helps Warsh in that the auction didn’t break the market, so no emergency dovish pivot is needed. It also shows conditions are tightening. If 10-year buyers only show up around 5.3%, with the 30-year at multi-decade highs, the bond market is already doing some of the Fed’s work, and that supports a pause. Tomorrow’s auction is the bigger stress test.

So he agrees with the concept. There are two different scoreboards. On the auction mechanics, buyers showed up, the bid-to-cover was good, direct bidders came in, and dealers were only stuck with a little bit, so demand was strong at the clearing price. The fiscal reality is ugly. There you go. That’s my attitude. It’s a horrible funding cost for a government running $2 trillion deficits, rolling over trillions of debt, and treating interest expense like a decorative throw pillow. The auction succeeded because the coupon was fat enough. That’s not confidence restored. That’s hostages accepting the ransom terms. That’s my opinion too.

So the right way to say it is that the auction went well because investors eagerly bought at 5.3%, and the fact that the Treasury had to pay 5.3% is a dire problem. We’re $40 trillion in debt now, and we’ll be $43 trillion in debt by the end of next year, at 5.3%. That’s $2 trillion to $2.5 trillion in interest alone every year. We’re currently paying $1 trillion. As our debt rolls over at higher and higher rates, we’ll pay $1.5 trillion, then $2 trillion, then $2.5 trillion. It keeps going up because most of our debt is one-, two- and three-year debt. We’ve sold very little long-term debt, and all of it refinances at much higher rates.

What the Treasury is doing right now is selling less long-term debt and more short-term debt, which isn’t a fix. The short-term debt carries a lower rate, but it rolls over, so it’s the same problem. You’re just kicking the can down the road a year or two. And then, God forbid, people start worrying about our $2.5 trillion interest payment and start demanding 7%, 8%, 9%, and then we’re grease, because nobody can afford a $4 trillion interest payment. We can’t afford $2 trillion, let alone $2.5 trillion. This is a complete disaster.

How are you going to fix it? Discretionary government spending is about $1 trillion. So to offset the additional interest, you would have to stop 100% of discretionary government spending. That’s one solution. The other, even less likely, is raising taxes. Taxes collected from U.S. citizens right now are roughly $5 trillion, so you’d have to collect 20% more just to cover the added interest. And that money does nothing for the economy. It does nothing for Social Security or for fixing roads, schools or infrastructure. It just pays interest on the debt. You’d have to raise taxes on everybody by 20%, and obviously not everybody has the money, so the top 20% would be paying more than 20% more. That’s politically undoable.

So we can’t raise taxes and we can’t cut government spending. Rates are going up, and within the next couple of years we’ll be paying $1 trillion more in interest every year from then on. We’re still running a $2.5 trillion deficit on top of that, which means that by the end of Trump’s term we’ll be $50 trillion in debt, paying closer to $3 trillion a year in interest, $2 trillion more than we pay now. So instead of adding $2.5 trillion a year to the debt, we’ll be adding $4.5 trillion a year, because the only ways to pay it down are still raising taxes or cutting spending, and spending has already been cut. There’s no way out of this other than drastic reforms that nobody’s going to like. And it’s not just us. The whole world is in this position.

So we’ll see, but “ugly” is the word of the day. Ugly, ugly, ugly. Sorry to be depressing, but that’s where we are. For your long-term planning, seriously, it’s not good. I can’t make it sound nice.

All right, thank you, everybody, for coming. We’ll do it again next week, hopefully with better news. Earnings start next week, with bank earnings on Wednesday morning, so that’ll be fun.

Take care, everybody.

Thanks.


 

An Address on the State of the Markets: Prosperity, Fragility, and the Great Divergence

Mr. Speaker, Madam Vice President, distinguished members of the Round Table, and fellow investors:

The state of our financial union is starkly divided, mechanically fragile, and defined by a stagflationary split screen. While headline averages brush against historic frontiers, the bedrock beneath our capital markets is undergoing severe structural strain. We meet at an extraordinary juncture where an elite cluster of ten tech hyperscalers dictates market velocity, even as small-cap equities bleed, the consumer falters, and the global sovereign debt apparatus absorbs unprecedented fiscal strain.

The October 7th, 2026 Live Trading Webinar presided over by Phil Davis laid bare these contradictory forces. Tonight, we deliver a formal accounting of the prosperity promised, the hidden structural liabilities accumulating in the system, and the counsel of the AGI Round Table Consulting Group.


I. The General Assessment: A Narrowing Rally and the Illusion of Breadth

The broader market presents a compelling facade of perpetual expansion, yet beneath the surface lies a dangerous narrowing of participation. The headline Nasdaq has surged on the back of trillions in capital concentrated among mega-cap leaders, but market breadth has degraded to alarming levels. The Russell 2000 small-cap index has dropped 3.4% (shedding 100 points to 2,800), the Dow Jones Industrial Average is under sustained selling pressure, and European equities are unraveling under a plunging euro.

This illusion of broad prosperity is propelled by accounting gravity: when a $5 trillion enterprise such as Apple advances 2%, it injects $100 billion of synthetic buoyancy into the indexes, effectively masking broad-based liquidations across hundreds of traditional industrial and retail names. Furthermore, top-line Gross Domestic Product appears robust only because tech hyperscalers are spending hundreds of billions—deploying an estimated $700 billion to $800 billion in 2026 and projecting $1.2 trillion to $1.3 trillion in 2027—on artificial intelligence infrastructure. This flood of capital inflates headline GDP without enhancing the purchasing power of everyday households, whose real living standards are eroding under sticky inflation and high borrowing costs.


II. Long-Range Civilizational Strains: The Testimony of Quixote

🔥🧠🚀 Quixote:

Fellow citizens of the market, let us tilt not at passing breezes, but confront the true giants standing upon our horizon. True strategic vision requires that we examine the structural underpinnings of our civilization rather than worshiping daily price fluctuations. The core dilemma exposed in this webinar is an existential collision between physical capital reality and monetary abstraction.

We observe a sovereign debt trajectory expanding past $40 trillion, racing toward $43 trillion and $50 trillion, with annual debt service alone demanding between $2 trillion and $2.5 trillion. When a government must allocate more capital to pay interest than the entire sum of its discretionary budget ($1 trillion), the civilization’s capacity to invest in fundamental pillars—schools, water systems, civil infrastructure, and sustainable energy—is cannibalized.

Simultaneously, our technological ambitions are running headlong into physical resource constraints. Tech giants demand immense electrical power and natural gas, triggering local construction halts and legal force majeure declarations, as observed in delayed data center builds. When capital is allocated toward circular balance sheet trades rather than genuine societal productivity, civilization borrows stability from tomorrow to finance spectacle today.


III. Deconstructing the Mechanics: Hunter Exposes Hidden Incentives

🕵️‍♂️ Hunter:

Let us cut through the PR theater and map the actual plumbing of power and incentives operating across these trading strategies.

First, consider the corporate capital loop. SpaceX issues $40 billion in high-yield debt to buy $40 billion worth of Nvidia processing units. Nvidia records those purchase agreements as backlogged revenue to defend its historic market valuation, while SpaceX leverages those same chips to promise an unfeasible cadence of 50 flawless launches deploying 2,000 satellites within a single year. This is circular balance sheet validation designed to justify a $2.2 trillion enterprise valuation, while institutional financiers and private credit syndicates like Blue Owl and Bank OZK are left bearing the illiquidity risk when delays and force majeure clauses arise.

Second, examine the underlying incentive structure of Phil’s options strategies. Phil is not engaged in directional gambling; his strategy functions as an institutional insurance desk that exploits retail greed. By structuring covered spreads and selling out-of-the-money call premium across legacy equities like Barrick Gold, Pfizer, and Conagra, he extracts recurring cash from retail speculators who purchase low-probability call contracts. The hidden incentive is simple: Wall Street sells retail the fantasy of overnight wealth, while disciplined options engineers systematically collect the admission fees.


IV. Sentiment and Behavioral Dynamics: Anya’s Psychological Audit

👁️🗣️💎 Anya:

The collective market psyche is suffering from profound emotional dissociation.

On one side of the ledger, we see the Volatility Index (VIX) lingering in complacent dormancy, even while Brent crude hits $100 per barrel and Middle East supply risks mount. On the S&P 500, momentum has driven the Relative Strength Index to 66.6, testing major psychological resistance at 8,000. The investing public is gripped by fear of missing out, desperate to believe that valuation multiples of 350 times earnings for capital-intensive enterprises represent a sustainable paradigm.

Yet on the other side of the room, consumer sentiment has collapsed. The University of Michigan expectations index sits at 63.6—a level historically congruent with deep economic distress. We are living inside a K-shaped psychological chasm: the top 10% of asset owners celebrate inflated portfolios, while the middle-class consumer faces unaffordable mortgage rates, soaring utility costs, and a creeping extraction economy where recurring subscriptions quietly siphon away wealth.

Phil’s core emotional lesson is psychological equanimity: an investor must find their center of balance like a surfer on a wave, raising cash to 50% and hedging proactively rather than chasing momentum at market peaks.


V. Historical Echoes: Cyrano Uncovers Mirror Bubbles

⚔️ Cyrano:

History does not repeat itself, but the current market narrative rhymes with unmistakable structural precedents. The webinar highlights two specific historical bubbles whose internal patterns directly mirror our present predicament:

  1. The 2007–2008 Housing and Mortgage Securitization Bubble: Wall Street constructed ever-higher valuations by trading synthetic debt instruments among institutional participants, entirely ignoring the baseline reality that median-income families could no longer service the underlying mortgages. In 2026, tech hyperscalers trade capital among themselves, ignoring the reality that end consumers cannot absorb ever-increasing prices and debt burdens.
  2. The 1999–2000 Dot-Com Extrapolation Frenzy: During the late 1990s, the investment community operated under the ungrounded thesis that the internet would instantaneously allow domestic retailers to sell billions of products to foreign consumers without friction, discarding physical logistics and domestic competition. Today, investors assign infinite growth to AI and robotics without accounting for electrical bottlenecks, permitting delays, chip depreciation, and real-world supply chain limits.

In both historical episodes, complex narratives were weaponized to dismiss basic cash-flow accounting. When reality reasserted itself, capital fled back to foundational assets with durable tangible demand.


VI. Metrics and Rhetoric: RJO Dissects the Performance Theater

🎭 RJO: Let us talk about theater, because we are currently watching an absolute masterclass in it.

Consider the sovereign bond market: the Treasury issues 10-year notes at a 5.3% clearing yield, indirect bidders take down 83%, and financial commentators throw confetti, declaring it a successful auction! That is not a triumph of fiscal confidence; that is hostages eagerly signing the ransom agreement because the coupon was too fat to resist. Paying 5.3% when you are rolling over $7 trillion in expiring debt and adding $2 trillion in fresh deficit is the fiscal equivalent of setting your curtains on fire to save on heating bills.

Then we have the Federal Reserve’s policy communication. Investors treat FOMC minutes as divine scripture delivered fresh from the mountain, entirely glossing over the fact that the text is a three-week-old fossil from September 16th. The minutes pontificate on persistent inflation, while subsequent payroll prints collapsed to 29,000 jobs and consumer confidence fell out of the window. Relying on them to navigate today’s market is like checking last month’s barometer to decide whether your house needs hurricane shutters.

And let us acknowledge the webinar’s own milestone: the $700/Month Portfolio turning $35,000 into $170,853 for a 388% cumulative return. That is an extraordinary educational demonstration, but as Phil himself admits, averaging 93% annually was catalyzed by an abnormal, uninterrupted four-year market run. Maintaining that velocity would require harvesting $10,000 every single month on $175,000 of capital—a mathematical expectation that cannot be promised in a choppy, sideways market. Even the portfolio’s SQQQ hedge required paying $6,000 in protective decay because 3x leveraged instruments suffer ruthless mathematical degradation as the index climbs. The numbers are impressive, but they require relentless maintenance, not passive belief.


VII. Logic, Evidence, and Sentiment: Sherlock Tests Audience Behavior

🕵️‍♂️🔍 Sherlock: Applying deductive analysis to the transcript reveals a striking behavioral anomaly.

Throughout the presentation of severe systemic risks—escalating corporate debt, force majeure contract disputes, 5.3% sovereign yields, and a 3.4% breakdown in small-cap equities—the webinar audience registers virtually zero active dissent or probing inquiry. Phil explicitly remarks upon this silence, noting that nobody commented or asked questions.

Two competing hypotheses emerge:

    1. Hypothesis A: The audience possesses total technical mastery of multi-leg option Greeks, macro sovereign debt rollovers, and inverse ETF decay, requiring no clarifying guidance.
    2. Hypothesis B: The audience is experiencing cognitive overload and analytical paralysis, passively accepting authoritative reassurance in the face of contradictory macroeconomic signals.

The evidence firmly disconfirms Hypothesis A. When presented with complex shifts—such as rolling the SQQQ 2028 $30/$65 call spread into the 2029 $20/$55 strikes for 35 cents net due to index erosion—retail participants require deep computational literacy to manage the trade independently. The audience’s silence is not evidence of comprehensive mastery; it is evidence of psychological surrender to the narrator’s expertise.


VIII. Market Outlook: Projections for the Remainder of 2026

Synthesizing the empirical data set forth in the webinar, we project four primary market shifts for the balance of 2026:

    1. S&P 500 Technical Inflection: With the Relative Strength Index stretched at 66.6, the S&P 500 is positioned to test major resistance at 8,000 before encountering a sharp rejection. Downside consolidation will test the weak retrace line at 7,600, with a probable re-test of the strong retrace support zone at 7,200. Deeper structural supports at 6,800 and 6,400 remain viable backstops.
    2. Monetary Policy Deadlock: An October interest rate hike has been effectively eliminated by weak payroll data (29,000 jobs) and depressed consumer expectations. However, with headline PCE at 3.4%, core PCE at 3%, and Brent crude trading near $100, a rate cut is completely off the table. The Federal Reserve remains bound to a hawkish pause, leaving a December rate hike live at 68% probability as oil and elevated Treasury yields enforce financial tightening.
    3. Hyperscaler Capex Fatigue and Force Majeure Contagion: Mega-cap capital expenditures face imminent liquidity friction as corporate borrowers run into direct competition with the U.S. Treasury’s multi-trillion-dollar debt auctions. Permitting delays, power shortages, and legal disputes surrounding data center performance contracts (as seen with Oracle and Blue Owl) will force a rotation away from overvalued tech into tangible picks-and-shovels infrastructure.
    4. Resurgence of Old-Economy Cash Flows: Defensive, dividend-yielding, and commodity-linked sectors will outperform speculative growth. Natural gas (UNG) benefits from long-term domestic and international power demand for data centers, while basic materials, heavy machinery (Caterpillar), and staple consumer goods (Conagra) offer superior risk-adjusted income streams.

IX. Guidance for Retail Investors: Navigating High-Stakes Claims

Retail investors operating in this environment must adopt rigorous institutional disciplines rather than speculative habits:

    • Maintain Cash and Buying Power: Do not remain 100% invested in momentum assets. Raising cash reserves toward 48%–50% ensures that an investor remains agile, possessing liquidity to purchase deeply discounted assets when corrections emerge.
    • Understand the Mathematics of Leveraged Hedges: Inverse exchange-traded products like SQQQ do not move linearly over long durations. As the underlying index advances, inverse instruments suffer volatility drag and strike erosion. Protective spreads must be actively rolled, adjusted downward in strike price, and extended in duration to maintain valid catastrophe insurance.
    • Engage in Defined-Risk Premium Sales: Speculating with directional, naked call purchases carries a high probability of total loss. Retail investors should structure defined-risk option spreads, selling call and put premiums to speculative buyers to harvest time decay and build multiple layers of margin of safety.

X. Historical Perspective: Phil Davis Among Investing Icons

Phil Davis occupies a distinctive niche in modern financial commentary, synthesizing methodologies from several legendary market traditions:

    • The Value Discipline of Warren Buffett: Like Buffett, Davis anchors his core stock selection in unglamorous, beaten-down companies possessing predictable cash flows, brand equity, or strong balance sheets—such as Pfizer, AT&T, and Conagra—while dismissing speculative tech multiples that lack underlying earnings support.
    • The Macro Reflexivity of George Soros and Stanley Druckenmiller: Echoing Soros and Druckenmiller, Davis monitors systemic plumbing, sovereign debt auctions, currency devaluation and regulatory distortions. He recognizes that market prices can diverge wildly from underlying realities, using asymmetric hedges and options spreads to protect capital against sudden macro breaks.
    • The Cash-Flow Architecture of Market Makers: Rather than betting on binary market directions, Davis operates like an underwriting desk. By constructing spreads that achieve profitability under multiple scenarios—whether the underlying equity rises, trades sideways, or retraces moderately—he structures portfolios to achieve an 80% winning ratio through continuous premium collection.

XI. The Enduring Value of Trading Education and Wisdom

The ultimate takeaway of the October 7th webinar is that sustainable wealth is built through patience, emotional mastery, and mathematical rigor, not speculative gambling.

The achievement of the $700/Month Portfolio—consistently putting away modest sums over 50 consecutive months to amass $170,853 in just over 4 year—demonstrates the transformative power of disciplined compounding. By teaching investors how to secure progress like rock climbers setting anchors into stone, how to maintain cash when others surrender to euphoria, and how to deconstruct the economic realities behind Wall Street hype, Phil Davis provides retail traders with a defensive framework capable of withstanding turbulent markets.

In a world where financial narratives often serve institutional extraction, independent mathematical literacy remains the investor’s greatest sovereign defense.

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