The damage will not be undone when the Trump administration is gone.
By Eliot A. Cohen, The Atlantic
The memorandum of understanding that the United States signed with Iran is, on first reading, a capitulation masquerading as an agreement. It opens the prospect of an Iran flush with money from the release of its assets, oil revenues, and even development investments to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars. The deal might even allow Iran to monetize its geographic position at the Strait of Hormuz by levying fees or tolls. That it betrays Israel, an ally who fought alongside the United States for a month but is shut out from the negotiations and is not even mentioned in the document, is par for the course for this administration.
Summary
Eliot A. Cohen argues that the Trump administration’s agreement with Iran is effectively a strategic retreat disguised as diplomacy. In his view, the deal gives Iran access to large amounts of money, strengthens its regional influence, and sidelines Israel despite Israel having fought alongside the United States during the war.
The article argues that the war revealed several uncomfortable realities about both the United States and the broader modern military balance. Although American and Israeli strikes inflicted serious damage on Iran’s military infrastructure, Cohen believes Iran also demonstrated its ability to threaten global energy markets through the Strait of Hormuz and project strength across the region. He argues that many countries—including China, Russia, Gulf states, and Israel—will now see the United States as weaker, less reliable, and strategically inconsistent.
A major theme of the article is that the conflict exposed structural weaknesses in the American way of war. Cohen says the U.S. military relies too heavily on small numbers of extremely advanced weapons and assumes it will always have secure bases, supportive allies, and enough time to build up forces before a conflict. The war, he argues, showed shortages in munitions, weak defenses against missiles and drones, and strained alliances.
The article also emphasizes broader military lessons from recent wars, especially Ukraine. Cohen argues that modern warfare increasingly favors cheaper mass-produced drones and missiles over expensive legacy systems, that air superiority is much harder to achieve than in past wars, and that long wars of attrition are replacing expectations of quick victories.
For Israel, the article presents a mixed picture. Cohen says Israel demonstrated major military capability and close operational cooperation with the United States, but also suffered growing international isolation and may ultimately face a more dangerous Iran in the future.
The article concludes with a broader warning: the damage goes beyond one administration or one conflict. Cohen argues that decades of strategic complacency, overconfidence, and underinvestment in military depth have left the United States vulnerable in a world where warfare is changing rapidly.
