I STARTED MY ARMY CAREER IN TANKS, so when President Trump announced on Sunday that the U.S. Navy would begin a “blockade” of the Strait of Hormuz, I started calling up some old naval officer friends, some American, some allies. They are all professionals who spent their careers commanding ships in waters like the Strait of Hormuz. I asked them to explain, in terms I would understand as an Army guy, what our Navy is dealing with when facing Iran—not in naval jargon, but in language a former tanker could grasp.
What they provided was instructive. And sobering.
What a ‘Blockade’ in the Strait of Hormuz Really Means, The Bulwark (pdf)
Summary
When policymakers or commentators talk about “blocking” the Strait of Hormuz, it sounds like a clean, decisive action—something you can do by simply sending ships into position and shutting the door. What this piece makes clear is that the reality is nothing like that. A blockade, especially in a place as strategically vital and physically constrained as Hormuz, is not a single action but an ongoing, complex military campaign that unfolds across multiple layers at once.
The first important distinction the article draws is between what is being said publicly and what is likely happening in practice. While the rhetoric suggests a full closure of the Strait, the actual operation appears to be more limited—focused on restricting Iranian port access while still allowing neutral shipping to pass through. Blocking Iranian activity is difficult but manageable; trying to fully control all traffic through one of the world’s busiest energy chokepoints is something else entirely.
What does a blockade actually entail? It’s not just about positioning ships—it requires suppressing threats across multiple domains. Iran’s capabilities include fast attack boats, coastal missile systems, drones, submarines, and, most importantly, naval mines. Those mines are a central problem because they are relatively cheap to deploy and extremely disruptive. If Iran can continue laying them, the U.S. isn’t solving the problem—it’s constantly reacting to it.
At the same time, U.S. forces have to protect themselves. That’s where large warships like destroyers come in. These ships are highly capable, but not in the way people might assume. They aren’t designed to hunt mines directly; instead, they provide air and missile defense, gather intelligence, and create a protective umbrella that allows smaller, specialized mine-clearing units to operate. They secure the environment so the real clearing work can happen.
And then there’s the actual enforcement of the blockade, which is often overlooked. Controlling maritime traffic means identifying ships, stopping them, boarding them, inspecting cargo, and redirecting them if necessary. That requires not just ships, but helicopters, boarding teams, surveillance aircraft, and continuous coordination. It’s a persistent, labor-intensive process.
Another key point is how dependent this kind of mission is on allies. The U.S. has long relied on partners like the British, French, and others for mine countermeasure capabilities, particularly in tight, complex waterways like the Persian Gulf. If those allies hesitate to participate—whether for political or strategic reasons—the burden on U.S. forces increases significantly, making the mission harder to sustain.
All of this leads to the article’s central takeaway: the difference between a limited and a full blockade is exponential. A limited operation targeting Iranian ports can likely be handled with the forces currently in the region. But a full blockade of the Strait would require a much larger, sustained effort: multiple layers of naval presence stretching from the Gulf of Oman through the Strait itself, continuous mine-clearing operations, constant surveillance, and the ability to defend against ongoing threats. It would likely take months, involve thousands of personnel, and carry significant financial and strategic costs.
Perhaps most importantly, the article emphasizes that Iran doesn’t need to win a conventional naval battle to complicate this mission. It only needs to keep the environment unstable—laying mines, threatening ships, and raising the perceived risk of transit. That alone can disrupt global shipping and drive up oil prices, achieving strategic effects without direct confrontation.
In the end, the phrase “blockade the Strait of Hormuz” captures the politics of the situation but not the reality. In practice, this will be a long, resource-intensive effort with no clean endpoint—one that depends as much on endurance, coordination, and risk management as it does on raw military power.
