Earnings Update & LIVE FED Minutes (5/20/2026)
Phil’s Stock World Weekly Webinar
Timeline
00:00 – SoFi options position and fills
02:00 – Option pricing and bid/ask strategy
05:15 – Risk management and spreads
06:20 – SoFi earnings and growth discussion
09:40 – SoFi earnings math and projections
12:45 – Using AI (“Bod”) for financial analysis
16:20 – SoFi strategy and covered calls
20:00 – SoFi investment cycles and Q4 expectations
21:20 – Nvidia business transformation
24:20 – Nvidia margins and AI infrastructure boom
26:00 – Detroit analogy and industrial buildouts
27:30 – Meta Louisiana data center project
30:00 – Data center water and power consumption
34:10 – Nvidia economics and chip spending
36:40 – Nvidia gaming origins and AI chips
40:00 – Nvidia pricing power and shortages
42:20 – Old computer hardware analogy
45:40 – AI infrastructure obsolescence risk
47:00 – Waiting for AI technology to improve
49:20 – Meta and failed metaverse strategy
54:20 – Treasury debt rollover and rising rates
56:30 – Liquidity pressures and hyperscaler spending
58:00 – Bond market mechanics and Greece comparison
1:00:00 – IPO boom and SpaceX valuation discussion
1:02:10 – Earnings season overview
1:04:00 – Upcoming earnings and market opportunities
1:06:00 – Russell earnings expectations and Treasury yields
1:07:00 – TINA ending and higher Treasury yields
1:10:00 – AI valuations and bubble comparisons
1:13:00 – Commoditization and technology cycles
1:15:00 – AI spending, rates, and volatility
1:20:00 – Post-2008 easy-money era discussion
1:23:00 – AI infrastructure and energy demand
1:26:00 – Long-duration valuations and interest rates
1:28:00 – Market momentum and bubble psychology
1:30:00 – Liquidity, volatility, and trading strategy
1:33:00 – Growth expectations and valuation risk
1:36:00 – Politics, debt, and macro instability
1:39:00 – AI arms race and corporate spending fear
1:42:00 – Inflation pressures and structural change
1:45:00 – Adapting to new market regimes
1:48:00 – Technological revolutions and overbuilding
1:51:00 – Flexibility, risk management, and market transitions
Transcript
The pieces of the position filled, and they did pretty well. I feel very good about that. We got the puts filled at 115, and now they’re 102. That’s going well. This one filled at 435, now it’s 425. And this filled at 8, and now it’s 8:17.
Do we still have a working order on SoFi? Let’s take a look.
Position, position, position… No, we didn’t sell—I guess we didn’t even ask to sell the short calls. Or did we? Oh yes, we did. We have 10 longs. Quantity 10, quantity 10. I’m very confused. Let’s try that again.
Why does this say we have 25? Yeah, I don’t know what’s going on here.
Okay, we have 25 of these longs and we only sold 10 of those. Was that my intention? I don’t remember. Anyway, that’s our position.
Now we have either a partial fill or full fill—I honestly don’t remember what I said last week. SoFi is making this little W pattern, which is fine by us. Those are weeks too. Last week was the 13th.
This is what I mean by putting in option orders good-til-cancelled. It went up well more than 60 cents. We were filling around this time of day, around 15.40, and it went up to 16.20 or even higher. Obviously any short calls you wanted to sell would have filled. Then it fell all the way back down 40 cents lower and that filled our puts.
Options can look flat as a pancake, but when you really examine them, they go up and down constantly. So when you’re pricing an option for sale, you have to look at the bid-ask spread and say, “Well, it’s 14.35 to 14.40, and I really think I should get the 14.40.” Or even higher.
You have to say to yourself: if the delta is 59 and the stock moves 40 cents, I should be able to get roughly 24 cents more for the option. Those 24 cents really add up.
So instead of saying, “I’ll sell these calls for 4.35,” I’m going to say, “I’ll sell them for 4.55.” That’s your bullish bet. I’m saying I’d like to sell that, but I’d like to sell it at 4.50 instead of 4.35. I’m bullish on the stock, so I can take a little chance and try to get a favorable fill.
It doesn’t sound like much, but it’s $250 on 10 contracts. If you’re doing several legs a day and 10 trades a month, those little improvements add up to real money. And that’s just for 10 contracts. If you’re trading larger size, it matters even more. You’ve got to learn to gamble appropriately.
We have a 10/20 spread, so what’s the worst-case scenario? The worst case is I fill my 10s and the stock goes lower and I can’t get my 4.50 for the calls. Fine. I still have an $8 spread and I still net 3.50 on it. If it starts going lower, I can sell a lower strike or wait, depending on how I feel about the stock.
The important point is: you’ve got to get your fills. That was the whole purpose of what I was demonstrating last week.
Now I remember what I was doing. We sold the puts, but we didn’t want to sell the calls because the stock was still low in the channel. It’s recovering nicely off the bottom and it’s back over our 15.40 entry, but I still don’t quite feel like selling short-term calls because they just had earnings.
The earnings were “in line,” but for SoFi, “in line” still means incredible growth. Their sales are almost parabolic. We talked about the share issuance—they issue shares to raise cash so they can make more money. I don’t mind that. The EPS is a little rough because they’re hiring loan officers, expanding systems, bringing in staff. This is a rapidly growing business. They have to spend money to make money, and as long as sales keep growing, we’re in good shape.
This year they’re supposed to make about $800 million. They have around 1.28 billion shares outstanding. They made 12 cents a share this quarter, which works out to roughly $153 million in earnings.
They project around $800 million for the year, so they’re behind pace. Last quarter they made 13 cents, this quarter 12 cents. So yes, they are behind schedule. That means they made around $300 million in the first half of the year. Are they going to make $500 million in the next two quarters? That’s tricky, but you have to understand the spending and investment cycle.
The nice thing about working with AI for a long period of time is it understands what I mean. I can talk to it like a coworker. The AI says they can plausibly hit the numbers, but margins need to stay elevated in the back half of the year. Management reaffirmed guidance, which tells you they expect a very strong Q4. They know they’re behind pace, so they must be expecting a significant acceleration later in the year.
That means from the perspective of owning SoFi, I’m now waiting for the stock to go higher. I’m waiting for it to get back to 16, and then I’ll probably sell more aggressive short calls—maybe the 16s instead of the 17s—because I’d rather take the money now in case they miss their numbers.
If they miss, people are going to get upset very quickly because the stock is already trading around 19 times forward earnings. If a growth bank stops being perceived as a growth company, things can get ugly fast. But after that, there could also be tremendous upside if management delivers the strong Q4 they’re implying.
That’s the thing with companies like SoFi: they invest, invest, invest, then suddenly they’re much bigger than before. Then they invest again, and the cycle repeats. Not everybody is Nvidia.
Now let’s talk about Nvidia.
Five years ago Nvidia was basically a gaming company selling graphics chips. Now data-center revenue is over $62 billion. It’s not even the same company anymore. The old Nvidia—the graphics-card company—got swallowed by this unbelievably successful AI business.
The crazy thing is that all this revenue is highly profitable. But that’s also Nvidia’s Achilles’ heel. Right now nobody really has chips more advanced than Nvidia’s, so they’ve had the field mostly to themselves for a couple of years. They’re charging 50–60% margins on chips, which is insane.
At the same time, companies are building entirely new business models around these AI chips. Nvidia has years of backlog at almost any price they want to charge. They used to sell chips for $5,000; now they sell versions for $50,000.
This entire ecosystem is causing inflation everywhere. They’re buying copper, electricity, steel, labor, talent—everything. A whole new industry sprang up out of nowhere and it’s draining resources from the rest of the economy.
It’s similar to what happened when the auto industry transformed Detroit. Industries cluster together and reshape entire regions. Now parts of America are becoming “chip towns” and “data-center towns.”
Meta, for example, is building a massive data-center project in Louisiana. The numbers sound enormous—hundreds of billions of dollars—but much of that money ultimately flows to Nvidia for chips.
The problem is data centers don’t create many permanent jobs. They create a lot of temporary construction jobs, but afterward it’s mostly technicians and maintenance staff. Meanwhile they consume massive amounts of electricity and water.
People talk about electricity usage, but the real issue is water. Data centers require huge cooling systems, and water consumption is the part people don’t discuss enough.
The beautiful thing for Nvidia is they don’t have to build the data centers. They just sell the chips.
Right now Nvidia has tremendous pricing power. But eventually competitors will emerge. Alibaba, Google, Intel, and others are all developing chips. Nvidia’s advantage originally came from gaming. Gaming required massively complex real-time simulations, and those chips turned out to be perfect for AI workloads.
AI researchers basically went to Nvidia and said, “Can you adapt your gaming chips to model a brain?” Nvidia barely had to change the hardware. Mostly it was software changes.
Then suddenly companies wanted hundreds of millions of dollars worth of chips. Nvidia went from selling gaming hardware to consumers to selling industrial-scale computing infrastructure.
What does every company do when demand overwhelms supply? They raise prices.
That’s why Nvidia became the richest company in the world. The world cannot stop giving them money.
But here’s the catch: all of this technology becomes obsolete extremely quickly.
I remember my first big computer sale out of college. A doctor bought a server with a 300-megabyte hard drive that cost $25,000. At the time that was mind-blowing. Today we casually use storage devices thousands of times larger than that.
That’s the danger with these AI data centers. These $50,000 chips and $200 billion facilities may look cutting-edge today, but in five years much of it could be obsolete.
That’s why waiting has become such an important strategic decision in technology. Sometimes it’s smarter not to commit massive capital immediately, because the technology improves so quickly.
We’ve all seen it with AI already. A few years ago ChatGPT was primitive compared to what we have now. The same subscription price today buys vastly more computing capability than it did two or three years ago.
Meanwhile governments are borrowing enormous sums of money, hyperscalers are spending heavily, IPOs are soaking up liquidity, and everybody is competing for capital at the same time. That’s why rates are rising.
The government constantly rolls over debt and issues new debt. If buyers don’t want the bonds at current yields, the only solution is higher rates. That’s exactly what happened to Greece during its debt crisis, and it’s the same mechanism at work now.
There’s simply too much demand for money in the system all at once.
At the same time, earnings season is giving us a huge amount of information. Most S&P companies have already reported. Now we’re moving deeper into Russell earnings season. This is actually my favorite part of earnings season because we finally have enough data to make informed decisions across industries instead of guessing blindly.
The Russell is expecting nearly 45% earnings growth, which sounds huge. But last quarter analysts expected 63% and only got 35%.
One really important point is that the 10-year Treasury now yields more than the S&P 500 earnings yield. That means, at least on paper, investors are currently getting a better return from Treasuries than from stocks—even after this massive tech rally.
That matters because for years there was effectively “TINA” — There Is No Alternative. Rates were near zero, so investors had little choice but to buy stocks. But once Treasuries start paying competitive yields again, capital can move away from equities very quickly.
Now, does that automatically mean stocks crash tomorrow? No. Markets can stay expensive for a long time. But it changes the math.
The other thing people forget is that the Russell is much more economically sensitive than the mega-cap tech companies. The S&P is heavily dominated by a handful of giant firms—Nvidia, Microsoft, Apple, Meta, Amazon—whereas the Russell gives you a broader picture of the real economy.
So when the Russell estimates start coming down, you have to pay attention.
We’ve also got this bizarre environment where everybody is spending at once. Governments are spending. The military is spending. Hyperscalers are spending. AI companies are spending. IPOs are soaking up capital. Everybody wants money simultaneously, and meanwhile the Federal Reserve isn’t exactly easing aggressively. So where is all this money supposed to come from?
That’s why rates keep moving higher.
You also have this psychological problem in markets where people assume growth trends continue forever. That’s always the story in bubbles. Investors extrapolate the current trend indefinitely into the future, but history doesn’t really work that way.
Even Nvidia—which is obviously an incredible company—cannot maintain infinite growth forever. At some point competitors emerge, pricing power weakens, infrastructure buildouts slow down, and the economics normalize. That doesn’t mean Nvidia collapses tomorrow. It just means the expectations eventually become impossible to satisfy.
One of the things I always tell people is: don’t confuse an amazing product with an amazing stock at any price.
Cisco was an amazing company during the internet boom. Intel was an amazing company. Sun Microsystems was amazing. That didn’t stop investors from wildly overpaying for them.
The internet changed the world. The bubble was still a bubble.
That’s an important distinction people miss constantly. They think if the technology is real, then the valuations must also be justified. Those are two separate questions.
AI is obviously real. The productivity gains are real. The transformation is real. But that does not automatically mean every company associated with AI deserves any valuation investors decide to assign to it.
One thing people also don’t think about enough is commoditization. Once everybody can make similar chips, similar AI systems, and similar models, margins compress. That’s what happens in technology over time.
Look at flat-screen TVs. At first they were unbelievably expensive luxury products. Eventually they became commodities. Look at hard drives. Look at memory chips. Look at PCs. Technology almost always gets cheaper over time, not more expensive.
Right now Nvidia has incredible pricing power because demand exploded suddenly and supply couldn’t keep up. But over time, that imbalance will narrow.
Meanwhile companies are spending unbelievable sums building out infrastructure that could become obsolete much faster than they expect. That’s why I keep saying timing matters. Sometimes waiting is actually the intelligent move.
People act like if you don’t immediately spend $200 billion building AI infrastructure you’ll somehow miss the future forever. But technology moves so fast now that waiting even six months or a year can dramatically improve what you get for the same amount of money.
That’s one of the reasons I think some of these capital-spending numbers are completely insane. You’re seeing companies spend almost out of fear—fear of being left behind. That’s very different from disciplined investment based on expected returns.
And that’s how bubbles tend to form. People stop asking practical questions like, “What’s the return on this investment?” Instead they start asking, “What if we miss out?”
Those are very different mindsets.
Now, that doesn’t mean you can’t make money in the middle of it. Of course you can. Some of the greatest fortunes ever made happened during bubbles. But you have to understand what kind of environment you’re in.
This is not normal.
We have governments running massive deficits, military spending exploding, AI infrastructure spending exploding, giant IPOs coming, and all of it competing for the same pool of capital. At the same time, people still expect aggressive earnings growth. That’s a very difficult combination to sustain indefinitely.
One thing markets are extremely bad at is pricing long-term saturation risk. People price current momentum beautifully. They price future competition very poorly. That’s why markets overshoot both directions. They become too pessimistic during downturns and too optimistic during booms.
The psychology always swings too far, which is why you need discipline. You don’t want to become one of these people who either thinks the world is ending tomorrow or thinks stocks can only go up forever. The reality is usually somewhere in the middle.
That’s also why I prefer options strategies where we’re constantly taking premium and adjusting positions rather than simply making giant all-or-nothing directional bets. If volatility rises and expectations get repriced, you want flexibility.
Frankly, we’re entering an environment where flexibility matters more and more because macro conditions are becoming much less stable than they were during the zero-rate years.
That easy-money era distorted everything. People got used to the idea that capital was essentially free forever. But now money has a cost again, and once money has a cost, valuations matter again too.
One of the problems with markets right now is that people are still psychologically anchored to the post-2008 world—the zero-rate world.
For more than a decade, money was essentially free. Companies could borrow endlessly, governments could borrow endlessly, and investors were pushed into risk assets because there was nowhere else to go.
That environment changes how people think. It creates an entire generation of investors who don’t really understand what normal capital costs look like.
Now suddenly you have real interest rates again. You have real competition for capital again. And people are acting surprised that valuations are becoming unstable.
But this is what markets historically looked like. The abnormal period was the ultra-low-rate era.
That period distorted behavior everywhere. Companies stopped caring about profitability because growth alone was rewarded. Investors stopped caring about valuation discipline because every dip got rescued by liquidity.
Now people are trying to figure out whether we’re going back to a more normal world or whether AI changes everything enough to justify these valuations. That’s really the core debate.
I think AI absolutely changes the economy. I’m not skeptical about that part at all. The skepticism is about timing, profitability, and valuation. Those are different questions.
People always do this. They take a true technological trend and then attach impossible financial expectations to it.
Railroads changed the world. The railroad bubble still crashed. The internet changed the world. The dot-com bubble still crashed. Automobiles changed the world. That didn’t stop massive speculation and overbuilding.
The real technology story and the investment story are not automatically the same thing. That’s why you have to separate “Is this important?” from “What price should I pay for it?”
Right now people are paying extraordinary prices for future expectations. You can justify almost any valuation if you assume growth continues forever. But the entire game is whether those assumptions actually hold.
That’s why earnings matter so much now. For years, markets were basically driven by liquidity and narratives. Now we’re slowly moving back into an environment where actual cash flows matter again. That’s a major transition.
You can already see it in how violently stocks react to even small misses. A company misses guidance slightly and suddenly the stock is down 20%. Why? Because when valuations are stretched, there’s no room for disappointment.
That’s the danger of expensive markets, especially in sectors where investors are pricing perfection. The AI trade is heavily pricing perfection.
Now, some companies may deserve it. Nvidia may continue executing brilliantly. Microsoft may continue monetizing AI extremely well. But expectations are still incredibly high.
Meanwhile there’s another issue people underestimate: energy.
Everybody talks about chips, but chips are only part of the equation. AI requires enormous amounts of electricity. The power-demand implications are huge.
That’s one reason utilities and infrastructure companies are suddenly becoming very important to the AI story. People think AI is purely a software story. It’s not. It’s also an industrial story.
You need data centers, cooling systems, transmission infrastructure, power generation, networking equipment, construction labor, and water systems. This is physical infrastructure on a gigantic scale.
That’s another reason inflation pressures don’t necessarily disappear quickly. AI is extremely resource-intensive, and if you have governments running huge deficits at the same time corporations are spending hundreds of billions on AI infrastructure, that creates enormous competition for resources.
That’s one reason I think people are underestimating long-term rate pressures. Everybody keeps waiting for rates to collapse back to the old normal, but maybe the old normal is gone. Maybe structurally higher spending means structurally higher rates.
That’s a very different world from what investors got used to.
And if rates stay elevated longer, valuation math changes dramatically. That especially matters for long-duration assets—companies where most of the value is based on profits expected far in the future.
When discount rates rise, those future profits become less valuable in present-value terms. That’s why tech stocks become so sensitive to rates.
People talk about it constantly, but many investors still don’t really internalize how powerful that effect is. Tiny changes in assumptions can massively change valuation models.
That’s why markets can look irrational sometimes. They’re often reacting to changes in discount-rate expectations more than changes in actual business performance.
At the same time, there’s still a tremendous amount of momentum in these names. Momentum itself becomes self-reinforcing. As stocks go up, they attract more inflows. More inflows push them higher. Higher prices attract even more attention.
That feedback loop can continue much longer than people expect.
That’s why bubbles are psychologically difficult. You can see the excess and still get run over trying to short them too early. Timing matters enormously.
People who were “right” about the dot-com bubble in 1998 still got destroyed before eventually being proven correct. That’s why risk management matters more than ideology. You don’t want to become emotionally committed to a macro narrative. You want to stay flexible.
That’s one reason I like premium-selling strategies. Time decay gives you flexibility. Adjustments give you flexibility. You’re not dependent on making one gigantic directional prediction perfectly.
Especially now, macro conditions are changing constantly. Every few weeks something new appears: inflation fears, bond-market fears, geopolitical shocks, AI spending surges, military spending, debt concerns, IPO mania. The market narrative keeps rotating.
Underneath all of it, liquidity conditions are getting tighter, and ultimately liquidity drives almost everything. People focus on stories, but liquidity is usually the real driver.
When liquidity is abundant, almost everything works. When liquidity tightens, suddenly investors become selective again.
That’s why I think this period is going to become much more volatile. Not necessarily a straight crash—volatility. Big swings. Big rotations. Big repricings.
Honestly, that environment can actually be very good for active traders if they stay disciplined. The dangerous thing is complacency.
Complacency was rewarded for years. Buy every dip. Ignore valuation. Ignore debt. Ignore macro. Just keep buying. That strategy worked because liquidity overwhelmed everything.
But markets evolve, and when the environment changes, strategies that worked in one era can stop working very quickly. That’s something investors always relearn the hard way.
One of the things people underestimate is how quickly sentiment can shift once markets start questioning the sustainability of growth. When everything is going up, investors assume every company is a genius and every management team looks brilliant during a liquidity-driven expansion. But eventually markets start separating companies with durable profits from companies benefiting mainly from easy money and momentum, and that sorting process can get brutal.
It’s not always about earnings misses, either. Sometimes all it takes is a slight slowdown in growth. If investors are pricing 40% growth forever and suddenly growth drops to 25%, the stock can still get crushed even though the business itself is doing well. That’s the problem with high expectations: the market isn’t pricing “good,” it’s pricing perfection, and perfection is very hard to sustain.
At the same time, political risk is becoming a much larger market driver again. For years, people treated politics as background noise because central banks dominated everything. Now fiscal policy, tariffs, military spending, debt issuance, industrial policy, and geopolitics are all feeding into markets simultaneously. That creates a much more complicated macro environment.
Markets prefer stability and predictability, but what we have now is the opposite. Wars, trade conflicts, debt concerns, energy constraints, AI spending explosions, and political polarization are all feeding into the same system at once. That creates uncertainty premiums everywhere, and uncertainty raises the cost of capital because investors demand higher returns to compensate for risk.
So there’s this constant tug-of-war happening between technological optimism and macroeconomic pressure. The bulls focus on AI productivity and future growth, while the bears focus on debt, rates, liquidity, and valuations. Honestly, both sides have legitimate points, which is why this market has become psychologically difficult. There are real reasons to be bullish and real reasons to be cautious at the same time, and that usually produces volatility rather than clean trends.
People forget markets are supposed to have risk. They’re supposed to price uncertainty. The idea that stocks should simply rise endlessly every year was itself abnormal. We’re now moving back toward an environment where capital allocation matters again, which means investors will need to become more selective. Not every AI company will win, not every data-center investment will pay off, and not every giant valuation will be justified.
That’s always how technological revolutions work. During every boom period society overbuilds, overinvests, and creates excess capacity before consolidation eventually happens. Railroads overbuilt, telecom overbuilt, and fiber-optic infrastructure massively overbuilt during the dot-com era. Eventually demand catches up, but the original investors often do not benefit nearly as much as people imagine during the mania phase.
That’s another distinction people forget: society can benefit enormously from a technological revolution while many investors still lose money. The internet transformed civilization, but huge numbers of dot-com investors still got wiped out. Those two things are not contradictory, and the same could absolutely happen with AI.
AI could become one of the most transformative technologies in history while many AI-related investments still end up being poor investments because expectations became too extreme.
And the larger these numbers get, the more mathematically difficult the growth becomes. Once you’re generating hundreds of billions in revenue, maintaining the same growth rates becomes extraordinarily hard. That’s just arithmetic.
A small company can double relatively easily. A trillion-dollar company doubling is a completely different challenge. That’s why eventually even great companies slow down, though markets often forget that during euphoric phases.
Now, does that mean I’m bearish on technology? No. Not at all. Technology is still the dominant long-term force in the economy. But valuation discipline still matters.
You always have to ask: “How much future success is already priced into this stock?”
That’s the real question.
One thing I think investors are underestimating is how much AI spending is currently being driven by competitive fear rather than proven economics. Nobody wants to be the company that missed AI, so everybody is spending simultaneously. That creates an arms-race mentality, and arms races rarely produce rational capital allocation.
Companies become afraid not to spend, and that’s psychologically very powerful.
You saw the same thing during the internet buildout. Companies were terrified of being left behind online, so they spent aggressively, often without clear returns. Some of those investments ultimately paid off and some didn’t. But during the boom phase, nobody wanted to appear cautious because caution itself became interpreted as weakness.
That’s happening again now with AI. Every CEO feels pressure to demonstrate an AI strategy whether or not the economics are fully proven yet.
That doesn’t mean AI is fake. It means corporate behavior during technological transitions often becomes distorted.
Meanwhile, the physical resource demands are real. The power demand is real. The water demand is real. The infrastructure demand is real. All of that interacts with the broader macro economy.
That’s why I think investors are still underestimating inflationary pressures over the longer term. Not necessarily runaway inflation, but structurally higher inflation than the market became accustomed to during globalization and ultra-low-rate monetary policy.
We may simply be entering a world where capital, labor, energy, and infrastructure all remain more expensive than investors got used to. That has huge implications for valuation models and means old assumptions may no longer work.
Honestly, I think one of the hardest things for markets psychologically is letting go of the assumptions that worked during the previous cycle. People always anchor to the recent past, but market regimes change. The strategies that dominate one era often underperform badly in the next era.
That’s why adaptability matters so much. You can’t become religious about one style or one macro view. You have to adjust as conditions evolve.
Right now conditions are evolving very quickly. Technology is evolving quickly. Politics is evolving quickly. Global trade relationships are evolving quickly. Military dynamics are evolving quickly. Capital markets are evolving quickly.
That creates enormous complexity, and complexity tends to increase volatility because investors become less certain about future outcomes.
But again, volatility itself is not automatically bad. Volatility creates opportunity for disciplined traders. The real danger is leverage combined with complacency. That’s what destroys people during transitions between market regimes.
People become overconfident because prior strategies worked for years, and then suddenly the environment changes. That’s when risk management matters most.
That’s also why I keep emphasizing flexibility over certainty. Anybody claiming they know exactly how all of this resolves is probably overconfident. There are simply too many moving pieces right now.
What we can say is that AI is real, the spending boom is real, the infrastructure buildout is real, the debt pressures are real, the liquidity competition is real, and the geopolitical risks are real. All of those things are happening simultaneously.
That’s what makes this environment so unusual—and frankly, what makes it fascinating too.
We’re watching multiple historic transitions happen at the same time: a technological transition, a geopolitical transition, a monetary transition, and an industrial transition. Those don’t happen very often.
That’s why markets feel unstable. We’re in the middle of several overlapping structural shifts all happening at once, and whenever societies go through periods like that, volatility tends to rise because the old equilibrium breaks down before the new equilibrium fully forms.
That’s really where we are now.
So the key is not panic. The key is discipline.
Stay flexible. Manage risk. Understand valuations. Understand liquidity. Understand positioning.
And most importantly, don’t confuse exciting narratives with guaranteed investment outcomes. That’s probably the single biggest lesson investors repeatedly relearn in every cycle.



