The Global Risk Expert: The Real Global Danger is What Comes Next!
Timeline
00:00 Intro
02:04 The Report Warning of 2026’s Biggest Global Threats
07:04 Are We Watching International Cooperation Collapse in Real Time?
10:25 The Real Motive Behind Trump’s Most Controversial Moves
12:54 The Hidden Forces Driving the Iran War
19:12 The Critical Mistake That Escalated the Iran Conflict
20:38 Who Really Holds Power Inside Iran?
22:42 Why the U.S. Blocked the Strait of Hormuz—and What It Triggered
27:42 How the Lebanon–Iran War Spiral Began
29:36 What Could Have Prevented This Crisis From Unfolding?
32:00 The Unexpected Shifts in the Middle East
35:27 The Real Impact of Trump’s Impulse-Driven Decisions
41:01 The Path That Could Change Everything
45:21 Russia and China’s Calculated Response to the Iran War
48:19 What Europe Got Wrong – and Why It Matters Now
52:08 China’s Long-Term Strategy: Where Does It Leave America?
58:08 A Brief Break—But What Comes Next Matters More
01:00:14 I Predicted 2025—Here’s What’s Coming Next
01:04:31 Why AI Could Trigger a Global Economic Shock
01:06:28 The Unseen Workforce Powering AI’s Rise
01:10:13 Rising Public Anger: Why Elites and AI Leaders Are Under Fire
01:14:57 Is Universal Basic Income Becoming Inevitable?
01:16:22 The Growing Problems Big Tech Can’t Solve
01:22:42 Can the Tech Oligarchy Actually Be Stopped?
01:28:14 Is a True “Utopia” Possible?
01:34:55 Why Public Service Matters More Than Ever Today
01:38:07 At the End of Life: What Will Your Choices Really Mean?
Transcript
Ian Bremmer on the Top Global Risks of 2026
Steven Bartlett (host): Ian Bremmer, what is this document I have in front of me?
Ian Bremmer: This is our top risk report. We put it out at the beginning of every year to help people around the world understand the global risk environment.
Host: For the last 30 years, your firm has been trying to understand the world and help people make better decisions based on the big picture of what’s happening geopolitically. And every year you release this top risk report. The 2026 edition appears to be pretty prophetic — a lot of what you listed as top risks are already playing out before our eyes. You wrote this in January, and we’re now sitting here in April. What are the most important subjects from your top ten risks that we should talk about today?
Ian: I think there are three that are really significant.
Risk 1: The United States as the Biggest Driver of Geopolitical Uncertainty
The first is that the United States has become the biggest driver of risk — the biggest driver of geopolitical uncertainty in the world. We see that with the tariffs, with Venezuela, with Greenland, with Iran. If that level of uncertainty were coming from a smaller political system, the global impact wouldn’t matter as much. But everyone in the world is affected by even small changes in the United States — and suddenly we’re seeing big changes.
The Americans are saying: we no longer want to play by the rules we historically set up. We don’t want the free trade system we built. We don’t want to be the global policeman paying for collective security. We don’t want the open borders that used to welcome people from around the world. The American system isn’t being challenged by China — it’s being challenged by America’s own leadership, who are saying we refuse to be the leader we used to be.
Host: And this is the most critical risk on your list?
Ian: Without question. It’s happening right now. It’s overwhelmingly likely — overdetermined — and the impact is massive. Everything in the global economy, global politics, and global security is being driven by this change.
Risk 2: China’s Long Game on Critical Minerals and Energy
The second major risk is about how the second most powerful country in the world is responding to all of this. In the report we called it “Overpowered” — referring to the global energy dynamic. China has been working for decades to build the most effective electric vehicles at scale, the best batteries at scale, and to control critical minerals and rare earths. Not just to exploit them, but to reprocess them.
Host: For anyone who doesn’t know what critical minerals are, can you give us some color?
Ian: We’re talking about everything you take out of the ground — lithium, antimony — that’s in every device, in your car battery, in your missile systems and advanced weapons. You cannot have an advanced economy without critical minerals and rare earths. The Chinese have been investing at scale globally in this capability for decades, thinking long term. Much of the rest of the world has been thinking short term — just-in-time globalization, maximizing the next quarterly return.
That reality doesn’t make China the strongest economy today, but it sets them up for a much stronger long-term trajectory. As a risk, it’s not as immediately critical as the U.S. political revolution, because this plays out over a longer period — but it is absolutely severe. As countries start to see the Americans as less predictable, more and more of them are saying they want to hedge and do more with China. Those decisions really matter.
On Trump’s Trajectory and the Coming Political Revolution
Host: If this direction of travel continues, what happens to the global order?
Ian: Trump will fail. The level of policy incompetence and the unwillingness to take on expertise is ensuring that. He’s quite unpopular on so many issues right now. He’s going to lose badly in the midterm elections in November, and that will make him look like a lame duck. Republicans will start thinking about their own futures rather than holding on to this 80-year-old man.
Having said that, the underlying challenges for average Americans won’t have been resolved. So the demand for a political revolution in the United States will still be there. The question is: will the next person who captures that energy be focused on themselves or on the country?
Trump identified the symptoms and twice benefited as a political entrepreneur from free and fair elections. Take New York City right now — a democratic socialist is mayor of the capital of global capitalism and finance. That tells you something. There’s still a demand for something very different. We don’t know whether it’s coming from the left or the right, but the level of uncertainty is growing.
And it’s not just growing in the United States. If the Americans are no longer willing to act as global leaders, and no one else is capable of filling those shoes, you don’t have a G7 or G20 where governments agree on the rules of the road. You have a G0 — an absence of global leadership — where the powerful make the rules that are useful to them, and the weak have to accept it. That’s where we’re heading.
Why Trump Went to War with Iran
Host: I have to ask what on earth is going on with Iran. Trump said he was the president who was going to stop all the wars. What’s the big picture?
Ian: I think there are three reasons he did it.
First: the Venezuela factor. At the beginning of the year, Trump went into Venezuela. It was, from a military standpoint, as successful as you could possibly imagine — not a single American serviceman or woman killed. They went in, took Maduro out, didn’t kill or injure him, brought him to a jail in Brooklyn. His vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, became acting president and said, “We want to work with you. We’ll open our oil sector, our mining sector, we’ll improve things for the average Venezuelan.” The operation was enormously popular across South America, where Venezuela had been a genuine destabilizing force for years.
Trump felt great. He thought: I can do that in Iran, and even bigger.
Second: Trump’s history with Iran. In his first term, the Iranians were engaging in strikes against Americans directly and through proxies. Trump, in a bold move at the end of that term, ordered the assassination of Qasem Soleimani. Iran promised to destroy the United States — and then did nothing.
Then last June, as Iran was stockpiling enriched uranium at high levels and developing ballistic missiles, the Israelis went in and struck. Trump provided intelligence. He initially hesitated, but when it looked successful, he joined in. In that 12-day war, Iran talked big but didn’t hit the Americans. They fired missiles at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar — but warned the Americans through Iraq beforehand. They clearly didn’t want that fight.
So Trump was thinking: I’ll go in, take out the Supreme Leader, and they won’t want to fight me. Then the remaining Iranian leadership will want to work with me, just like in Venezuela.
Third, and most important: the loyalty problem. In Trump’s first term, he had people around him who were patriots first. When they disagreed with him, they pushed back, they leaked, and occasionally they found ways to prevent a bad decision from going forward — people like Mattis and Pompeo. This time around, even his best advisers — and he has some good ones, like Rubio and Bessent — share a singular characteristic: they are first and foremost loyal to the president and will not push back. What Trump hears is shaded toward how brilliant he is. And that makes him more confident even when the military thinks something is a terrible idea.
The head of the Joint Chiefs, Dan Caine, clearly believed this was a bad idea and understood the dangers — including Iran’s ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, which the U.S. military has gamed out for decades. Trump heard very little of that.
What Actually Happened — and Why It Went Wrong
Host: So he thought: take out the Supreme Leader, they’ll negotiate, we’ll get a compliant new leader?
Ian: Yes. It was supposed to be days, not a month. What actually happened is that when the Israelis took out the Supreme Leader and much of the military leadership, the Iranian response was to immediately decentralize. They went to what they call a “mosaic” situation — pushing military decision-making to local commanders, because centralized leadership would expose commanders to assassination. So suddenly you had Iranians taking shots at Gulf states, hitting critical infrastructure, and disrupting transit through the Strait — not from a central command, but from dispersed local forces.
Host: Do you think there’s actually anyone running Iran right now? Is it possible to negotiate with dispersed forces?
Ian: The honest answer is it’s impossible to know for certain — Iran’s internal decision-making is extremely buttoned up. But two things are easy to assess.
First, their ability to make centralized decisions and implement them is real. When their biggest gas field was hit and they said they’d retaliate, they did — in short order. We’ve seen several occasions in the last five weeks where a statement from the Iranian foreign ministry was followed quickly by action from a local commander, which implies there is a centralized structure.
Second, the fact that Iran showed up in Islamabad with significant leadership — the foreign minister, the speaker of parliament, and a team of experts briefed on negotiations covering the Strait, ballistic missiles, proxy support, and the nuclear issue — proves this regime is still very much functioning. They couldn’t get a deal, but the regime is intact. They couldn’t get a deal, but the regime is intact.
Trump’s Announcement of a Blockade
Host: Trump has just announced he’s going to block the Strait of Hormuz. What does that mean?
Ian: I think it’s overstated as a dramatic escalation. You had 21 hours of talks led by the Vice President of the United States. If those talks were a disaster, they’d have lasted two or three hours, not 21. 21 hours means very substantive conversations across the full range of issues important to both sides.
Trump didn’t get the outcome he wanted. The Iranians feel they have more leverage than the U.S. thinks they do. That frustrates Trump enormously. So at the end, after speaking with Vance more than ten times during the talks, Trump announced a blockade.
But just before markets opened on Monday, there was reporting that further talks would follow. So maybe it wasn’t such a disaster. What Trump may really be doing is signaling that he still has leverage to use, because frankly he’s lost a lot of it.
He gave one prime-time speech to the American people about Iran in which he said, “The war is almost over. Two to three weeks, max.” If I’m Iranian and I hear that, I think: the Americans can’t take this pain anymore. He keeps saying the Strait isn’t his problem. He doesn’t have a military solution. So the Iranians are hearing his words and watching what he actually does — and noticing that he changes his mind and frequently doesn’t follow through on threats.
They also know he’s becoming increasingly unpopular on this issue specifically, just as he was on Greenland — where he eventually did a complete 180. The Iranians may simply be incentivized to wait him out.
And they’ve watched what China did. When Trump hit China with tariffs, China hit back. He escalated, they escalated further, threatened critical minerals, and suddenly CEOs were flying to Mar-a-Lago saying “you have to deal with this.” In red states, Trump had to back down. A country with leverage over Trump can hit him — and while he has the most powerful military in the world, he also has a glass jaw in a democracy. He can’t take a hit the way unelected, non-democratic regimes can.
The Iranians also understand: they can’t be seen to have pandered to America under bombardment. If they set that precedent, every future American president will know the playbook — bomb their leadership, then they’ll come negotiate and give up everything. There’s a cost to caving that goes beyond this moment.
How This Ends — Two Scenarios
Ian: The most likely outcome is that the ceasefire is eventually extended. The 21-hour talks were substantive, and there will be more talks. I expect the Iranians are more likely to give ground on the nuclear issue and enrichment if they can maintain a privileged position on transit through the Strait — because that provides them with money and a form of deterrence. The Iranians never had nukes and were never going to get them. They knew that if they got that close, they’d be struck. But control of the Strait is leverage they actually have, they’ve used it, and they’re making money from it.
If that deal holds, over time the Iranians will cut more agreements with more countries to get oil out. Once a stable ceasefire is in place, Europeans, Indians, and others will come in and start escorting ships to create a more secure environment in the Strait itself.
That’s the better scenario — though really the less bad one, because all of this should have been avoided.
The other scenario is that everything Trump has said is because he doesn’t yet have a full military plan. There’s still a new aircraft strike group heading toward the Gulf, and thousands more American troops — nearly 15,000 total — being deployed. Once they’re in position, he can use them.
Trump has repeatedly talked about “taking the oil.” That’s not a blockade — that’s something different. Kharg Island, off the Iranian coast, is responsible for about 90% of Iranian oil exports. CENTCOM has estimated it can be taken with 12,000 to 15,000 men. If the Americans control Kharg, they control Iranian oil exports and gain enormous leverage over the Iranian economy.
Additional military plans involve raids on coastal regions to take out ballistic missile sites and drones, which would eventually make it possible to escort ships safely through the Strait — something that can’t be done right now.
I think the likelihood that Trump ultimately orders that is well below 50%. He understands how unpopular it would be. But it means he’s going to have to sell a pretty ugly outcome and call it a win. The fundamental problem for Trump is: he can’t blame anyone else for this. He is the decider. His own cabinet has said so. It was his war of choice. And he’s now facing an economic downturn with oil prices up, gas over four dollars a gallon, diesel over five, inflation ticking up, and food prices rising. He is completely responsible — and there’s no one else to blame.
Russia, China, and Europe’s Response
Host: Zooming out further — Russia is still at war with Ukraine, which has largely vanished from the U.S. news cycle. China must be watching all of this with some satisfaction. And Europe seems to be going its own way for the first time. What’s the big picture?
Ian: China is the most significant piece, but Russia is actually the easier story to tell.
Russia produces oil, gas, and fertilizer — all things whose prices have just spiked through the roof. Their economy was getting squeezed by sanctions, and now they’re making far more from everything they sell. On top of that, the weapons the U.S. has been selling to Europeans to pass to Ukraine — America now needs those for the Middle East. So Ukraine is going to have a harder time defending its cities against Russian ballistic missiles and drones. That means Putin is much less interested in a ceasefire — which he wasn’t very interested in to begin with. Trump promised to end that war, was hugely frustrated that he couldn’t, and now it’s even less likely to happen. Ultimately, that makes it more likely that Trump does a deal with Russia over the heads of the Europeans.
Host: What did Europe do wrong? I’m British, and I grew up thinking of Britain as a major global force. That perception has changed noticeably.
Ian: The way the Americans are talking to Europeans has a lot to do with the change in administration. No other president, Democrat or Republican, would treat close allies this way. But it’s true that over the last 30 years there have been two major geopolitical shifts: the rise of China and the global south, and the decline of American allies — Europe, Canada, Japan, South Korea.
These are countries that are mostly contracting demographically. They haven’t been investing in their own defense or technology. Growth is flatter, productivity much lower than in the U.S. And at exactly the same time the Americans are pulling back from global leadership, these countries bring less to the table.
The Draghi report — an 800-page competitiveness plan by former ECB chief Mario Draghi — lays out everything Europe needs to do: build entrepreneurship, invest in new technologies, reduce red tape. The plan is there. But unlike the U.S. or China, Europe is not a country. It’s 27 countries in the EU plus a post-Brexit UK. You can’t do the kind of long-term, large-scale strategic investment that the UAE, Singapore, or China can do.
So what did Europe get fundamentally wrong? After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Europeans believed the world was just going to be peaceful — that everyone would eventually converge on a European-style model. They didn’t need to invest in defense. Growth didn’t need to be massive because quality of life was so high. And they were completely wrong. China got wealthier but didn’t become a free market democracy. It became a consolidated dictatorship under Xi Jinping with state control of the economy. That’s not an environment where being non-competitive is comfortable.
Europe also made mistakes on energy. Most European countries turned away from nuclear — with the exception of France, which has benefited enormously — and tried to lean into green while making other technologies more challenging. Meanwhile China invested in everything: dirty coal to power industry in the short term, but also solar, wind, the best EV batteries at scale, and nuclear. Europe did a partial approach rather than an all-of-the-above approach, and that has clearly inhibited growth.
Is China Set to Become the World’s Leading Superpower?
Host: Is the U.S. about to lose its position as the world’s leading superpower to China?
Ian: Not soon. But the present trajectory, if it continues, would clearly challenge America’s dominant position. The dollar remains the global reserve currency by a wide margin, and that’s a massive advantage — the U.S. can run enormous deficits with lower interest rates as a result. China does not have a convertible currency. If they opened it to convertibility, there’d be massive capital flight and political instability. China’s military is still a fraction of U.S. capabilities. They’re watching what’s happening in Venezuela and Iran — they don’t have that kind of power projection. They’ve never fought a naval war; they haven’t fought a ground war in decades.
But there is a genuine concern. The world-changing new technologies — the Chinese are investing at scale and are now at parity or ahead of the Americans in many of the core technologies that matter most. What does that mean? They can set the rules. They can set the standards. They can sell the products you need. If they decide to shut you off, you’re in serious trouble.
Think about Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. The moment Russia invaded Ukraine and started cutting off supply, it devastated the European economy. Now think about the U.S. getting so many of its semiconductors from TSMC in Taiwan. What happens if China decides to cut that off? You don’t want to be in a position where an adversarial country produces all the things your economy desperately needs.
The Chinese aren’t doing this on a short-term timeline. They’re thinking ten, twenty years out, making no-regret moves to set themselves up long term while the Americans are consumed by electoral cycles and short-term decisions. The biggest danger to the United States isn’t China — it’s America getting in its own way, failing to invest in being the most competitive, most attractive place to study, live, and work.
Risk 3: Artificial Intelligence
Host: In your 2023 TED Talk, “The Next Global Superpower Isn’t Who You Think,” the top comments were essentially: “You called it. You were completely right.” What were you right about?
Ian: What I was saying is that the world is moving beyond geopolitics — that the most important new global actors aren’t countries, they’re technology companies writing their own rules. The Russian invasion of Ukraine effectively started on February 23rd, the day before the official start, when Microsoft detected the cyberstrikes hitting Ukraine and alerted both the U.S. and Ukrainian governments. And without Elon Musk providing Starlink, I’m not sure the Ukrainian government would have been able to keep fighting. These were companies making the decisive difference at a moment when governments were hesitant.
Now I look at new AI tools — specifically what Anthropic recently disclosed with what they’re calling “Mythos.” Anthropic released a new model so capable that they say it presents a genuine systemic security risk to the global economy. In testing, this model could find security vulnerabilities across a vast range of software applications — banks, critical infrastructure, power grids, water systems. Not just the things a normal hacker could get to, but every exploitable bug in everything with software.
It was so powerful they couldn’t release it because it would have been an immediate systemic risk.
Host: Do you believe that, or is it marketing?
Ian: It is inconceivable that a company this capable of raising money isn’t going to have a communication strategy aligned with that. So of course there’s marketing here. But the risk is real. When Jerome Powell at the Fed and Scott Bessent at Treasury looked at this and immediately convened an urgent meeting of bank CEOs, and when Jamie Dimon — who runs the most cyber-secure major institution in the U.S. — called it a five-alarm fire, I take this very seriously.
This is actually a big deal that also happens to be useful for Anthropic’s marketing — not least because Anthropic had just been in a fight with the Defense Department, which had tried to move away from them, saying they were too restrictive for use in targeting and surveillance. Well, it turns out you can’t afford to take them out of your system, because what they’re building is too important to national security.
The timing is convenient. But the risk is real — because this technology needs to be deployed immediately to find and patch those bugs before adversaries get access to the same tools. And they will. In very short order.
On the risk scale, I’d rate this severe — it would be critical if we were talking about two years out, but since it literally just happened, I’d say severe. And massively underappreciated compared to the attention being paid to Iran or China.
AI and the Economy: Job Displacement and Public Anger
Host: Is the fear about unemployment — AI taking our jobs — or something else?
Ian: Both, but the systemic financial risk I just described is distinct from the jobs question. If a model like that is in the wrong hands, your markets can go down. Banks stop working. Data is stolen. Imagine if the Russians or Iranians had that capacity. They will have it soon.
The jobs question is real but will play out more slowly than some predict. Most CEOs don’t want to lay off large numbers of workers unless forced to. Without a major economic downturn giving them that cover, I think it takes longer than people think. And you’ll see social mobilization — we saw it with longshoremen in the U.S. refusing AI, mobilizing, and keeping it out.
But politically, the wave is coming. I spoke recently with a centrist, pro-business U.S. senator who told me he can’t talk about data centers publicly right now. His constituents — not fringe voters, mainstream constituents — are more upset about AI data centers than about almost anything else. No local jobs. Energy prices going up. Water prices going up. Massive construction appearing in their neighborhoods. Everyone hates them.
Trump won with a lot of men who had good jobs but felt the world was moving away from them — they’d seen automation on their factory floors, free trade sending jobs abroad, immigrants coming in while no one seemed to be looking out for them. That same story now applies to women with advanced degrees in urban and suburban areas who are worried about their white-collar knowledge worker jobs. That wave of populism is absolutely coming in 2028 — and AI is a very big piece of it.
Host: We’re seeing real anger at tech CEOs. Sam Altman has had a Molotov cocktail thrown at his property. Someone shot at his house. And we all remember the United Healthcare CEO being shot a few blocks from where we’re sitting now.
Ian: There is general anger at the elite. The wealthiest Americans right now happen to be tech owners. It shouldn’t be surprising that this anger is manifesting this way — though violence of this kind is absolutely wrong.
The system is deploying these technologies in ways that allow the benefits to be captured by a small number of individuals and companies that write their own rules and don’t seem to care about the people who are getting left behind. When people feel there’s no way to respond within the legal framework — not by voting, but only through mass action or even violence — then politics are genuinely broken.
Solutions: What Good Governance of AI Would Look Like
Host: Is there a solution? Can technology thrive and benefit everyone?
Ian: Of course there is. These technologies are already doing extraordinary things — improving recycling through AI sorting, reducing airplane fuel consumption by 10% through real-time adjustments, optimizing crop planning for a hundred million farmers in Ethiopia. Every day I see uses for these technologies that blow my mind.
But if we blow ourselves up, it won’t be because of technology. It’ll be because of people and politics — because the system is deploying these technologies inhumanely and allowing the gains to be captured by a few.
If I could wave a wand, I’d want three things:
First: The U.S. and China need to start having AI arms control conversations. When we were fighting the Soviets, there were no arms control discussions until after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. We nearly destroyed the world. Then we developed hotlines, deconfliction mechanisms, limits on certain weapons development. We desperately need something equivalent between the U.S. and China on AI.
Second: We need something like an AI Stability Board — modeled on the Financial Stability Board that was built after the 2008 financial crisis. When there’s a financial crisis, the world comes together: the People’s Bank of China, the ECB, the Bank of England, the Fed — they all work together because they’re technocrats who understand the markets have to function. You need an equivalent body for AI: an independent board that can identify systemic threats, communicate them to those with power, and immediately address them. We don’t have that yet.
Third: We have to fund AI access for people who otherwise couldn’t take advantage of it. Half of Africa doesn’t have electricity. The gap between people with electricity and people without it is going to look minor compared to the gap between people who have AI as a tool and those who don’t. We’re talking about something that could effectively create two different categories of human beings. That is unacceptable. We have to spend the money to ensure everyone has access. We are nowhere close to that.
The Path to Utopia — and What Threatens It
Host: Is there a version of the future that’s genuinely good? Is utopia possible?
Ian: I don’t see how it isn’t. The big stories of the world over my lifetime — the last 50 years — have been about growth. Human beings living longer, with better education, better healthcare, more wealth, less starvation, less poverty. When you look at human history on the planet, we’ve generally moved toward more capacity. We’ve had some terrible episodes, but information spreads so fast now that we hear about the bad things in a way we never would have before.
What I worry about most is not artificial general intelligence. I worry about human beings becoming more computer-like. When you spend all of your time on a smartphone, that is a computer programming a human being. And we’re acting more like computers when we know we’re not like that.
What we’re doing right now — having a real conversation, two people who’ve never met — that’s a humane exchange. As soon as it gets intermediated by algorithms, as soon as you’re pushed into a lane, we become less human. Prediction markets turning our political institutions into a casino, algorithms keeping us angry and engaged — these things make us worse versions of ourselves. We need governance models and companies that help us be more of our better selves, not less.
Host: Do you have any closing remarks?
Ian: When I was in second grade, my teacher asked who wanted to be president. I was the only one with my hand up. I grew up believing that public service was the ultimate expression of how you make a difference. I wouldn’t raise my hand today — not because the system is irredeemably broken, but because we’ve created so many other ways to make a real difference globally outside of political institutions.
And whoever you are in your own sphere — if you’re independent, that independence is not just an opportunity, it’s a responsibility. There are so many people who can’t say what they think because they can be fired. If you can’t be fired, you have an obligation to say the hard things. That’s the antidote to the algorithmic world that wants to keep us each in our lane.
The part of my life that resists the algorithm is this: if you hold the same opinions as the world is changing, you will be wrong. The algorithm doesn’t want you to change your views. But that’s exactly when you have to.
Ian Bremmer is the founder of Eurasia Group and author of numerous books on geopolitics, including The Power of Crisis. His analysis is available on YouTube and on X.
