Two Dan Sullivans, One Election—and the Limits of the Law

Two Dan Sullivans, One Election—and the Limits of the Law

An alleged effort to confuse Alaska voters deserves scrutiny. That does not automatically give the government authority to block the election result.

At first glance, the Alaska Senate controversy seems straightforward. Republican Senator Dan S. Sullivan is seeking reelection against Democrat Mary Peltola. Another candidate, Daniel J. Sullivan Jr., is also on the ballot. Reporting suggests Democratic operatives helped recruit the second Sullivan in hopes that some voters would mistake him for the incumbent.

If that was the purpose, it was a deceptive tactic. Voters deserve to know whom they are supporting, and campaigns should compete on their candidates’ merits.

But the next question—whether this justifies blocking the election result—is much more complicated. The law does not give government officials a general power to stop an election whenever they encounter conduct they consider dishonest. They must identify a law that applies, establish the facts required by that law, and show that the remedy they seek is legally authorized.

That distinction protects everyone. Otherwise, an administration could use allegations of campaign misconduct to prevent an opposing candidate from taking office.

The allegations in Alaska are substantial. An October 28 New York Times investigation described an organized effort involving Peltola aides and Democratic operatives to recruit potential spoiler candidates. According to the reporting, a staffer was instructed to find Alaskans named Dan Sullivan. Interviews and text messages supported the broader account. This deserves more than dismissal as a partisan accusation.

What the reporting establishes about Peltola personally is less clear. Her former campaign manager, Elisa Rios, said Peltola knew about the effort, although she was not directly involved. Rios later tried to retract her statements. Peltola denies knowing about or participating in the recruitment.

It would therefore be inaccurate to say there is “no evidence” that Peltola knew: a former aide’s account is evidence, even when disputed. But it is equally wrong to treat that allegation as conclusive proof. The publicly reported evidence of an organized recruitment effort is stronger than the evidence establishing Peltola’s personal knowledge.

A candidate may benefit from something she did not request, authorize or know about. Benefit alone does not prove involvement. Any effort to hold Peltola personally responsible should distinguish what others reportedly did from what can actually be established about her conduct.

There is another important fact: Alaska’s courts already considered whether the second Sullivan could appear on the ballot.

State election officials initially tried to exclude him, arguing that his candidacy was intended to confuse voters. The courts restored him. A central reason was that Alaska law did not contain the “good faith” candidacy requirement officials were trying to enforce. The state could not create an additional qualification simply because it distrusted his motives.

That decision was not an endorsement of political deception. It was a limit on government power.

Imagine applying for a permit, meeting the legal requirements, and then being rejected because an official dislikes your reasons for applying. Unless the law makes those reasons relevant, the official cannot simply invent another condition. The same basic principle applies here: officials must administer the rules that exist.

Evidence that Democratic operatives encouraged Sullivan to run could strengthen the case that the tactic was deliberate. It would not, by itself, create a previously nonexistent rule against his candidacy.

The Trump administration has nevertheless sued to prevent certification under circumstances in which the incumbent loses and votes for the other Sullivan might have affected the outcome. Certification is the formal process of confirming the election result. Blocking it could leave the winner unable to take office while a dispute continues.

A federal lawsuit requires a federal legal basis. The Justice Department initially relied on the National Voter Registration Act. But, as Harvard election-law professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos explained, that statute governs voter registration. General language about protecting election integrity does not give the department unlimited authority over candidate eligibility or election certification.

The department later added a Supremacy Clause argument. That constitutional principle gives valid federal law priority over conflicting state law; invoking it still requires a valid federal right or authority to enforce. Adding a claim to a lawsuit does not establish that the claim succeeds. Alaska’s own officials have asked the court to dismiss the case, arguing that the federal challenge lacks a legal basis.

Even the question of harm requires care.

Suppose Peltola wins by 2,000 votes and the second Sullivan receives 3,000. That arithmetic would not prove that the incumbent should have won. Some voters might knowingly prefer the challenger. Others might otherwise have stayed home. Alaska’s ranked-choice system also allows someone who ranks the challenger first to rank the incumbent second, potentially transferring their vote to him if the challenger is eliminated.

The government cannot simply assume that every vote for one candidate rightfully belongs to another.

Alaska has also taken steps to distinguish the candidates. The ballot identifies the senator as the Republican incumbent, while listing the challenger as Daniel J. Sullivan Jr., without a party affiliation. Those distinctions do not guarantee that nobody will make a mistake, but they matter when evaluating claims that the ballot is inherently misleading.

Nor does every possible offense justify overturning an election. If investigators discover unlawful payments, false statements or campaign-finance violations, those allegations should be evaluated under the relevant laws. The appropriate consequences depend on what is proved and what those laws authorize. An investigation of campaign conduct and a challenge to the validity of an election are separate matters.

Peltola’s personal innocence would not necessarily defeat an otherwise valid election challenge: some election remedies address defects in the voting process regardless of a candidate’s knowledge. But the reverse is also true. Suspicion about her knowledge does not supply a missing legal basis for blocking certification.

Calling for accountability is reasonable. Treating disputed allegations as proof of personal guilt is not. And withholding an election result affects far more than the candidate: it affects every voter who knowingly and lawfully supported her.

The appropriate response is to investigate credible allegations, inform voters, count their ballots and apply the law. Anyone seeking to block the result should have to establish why the law authorizes that extraordinary step and why the evidence supports it.

A deceptive tactic may deserve condemnation. That does not give the government permission to invent a punishment—or to make voters bear it.