Iran War Expert: A Mass Casualty Attack Is Coming! ~ Robert Pape
Steven Bartlett, The Diary Of A CEO
The War everyone assumed was over may be about to become something far worse than we could have expected. Professor Robert Pape explains exactly why the deadliest phase of this war is still ahead, and how this could trigger a wave of terror across the world.
Robert Pape is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats.
Timeline
00:00:00 Intro
00:02:42 Why Robert Pape Isn’t Surprised
00:04:24 Why the US Blocked the Strait of Hormuz
00:05:43 The Secret JD Vance Peace Deal (MOU)
00:08:33 Iran as Regional Hegemon, Explained
00:10:00 How Do We Know This Is the Real Document?
00:21:25 Did the War Actually Make Iran Stronger?
00:22:26 The Viral Tweet: How Is Iran Still Hitting US Bases?
00:24:57 Trump Says Iran Is Destroyed — So How?
00:25:59 Where Iran Hides Its Drones (“A Truck in California”)
00:29:24 Iran Is Building New Drones the Whole Time
00:32:37 Are We on the Verge of a Global Economic Crisis?
00:36:47 What “Owning the L” Would Actually Look Like
00:38:57 Trump: The US Runs Out of Oil in 4 Weeks
00:40:52 The Midterm Elections Time Bomb
00:52:33 The Vietnam Parallel: LBJ’s Trap
00:55:26 Can the US Force the Strait of Hormuz Open?
01:03:27 A 70% Chance of Boots on the Ground in Iran
01:14:59 Why Invading (Not Bombing) Sparks Suicide Attacks
01:24:25 When the Two Crises Collide: A New 1960s?
01:25:21 Will Trump Lose the Midterms?
01:27:00 Is the US Running Out of Weapons?
01:29:00 What Is Trump’s Real Objective?
01:34:39 Pape’s Prediction for the Next Few Months
Summary
Robert Pape’s central argument is that the war with Iran has trapped the United States in an escalating conflict with no good short-term solution. Rather than weakening Iran, he believes the war has made it strategically stronger by giving it effective control over the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important oil-shipping routes. The United States must now choose between accepting that expanded Iranian power or escalating militarily in an attempt to reopen the strait—an effort Pape thinks is unlikely to succeed and could lead to a much larger, longer war.
Pape says the original attempt to destroy or topple Iran’s government through air power was based on a false assumption. Despite the killing of Iran’s supreme leader and many senior political and military officials, the regime survived, consistent with what Pape says is a century of evidence showing that bombing alone rarely overthrows governments. Iran then retaliated by closing or controlling the Strait of Hormuz, transforming the conflict from a bombing campaign into a struggle over regional power and the global oil supply.
According to Pape, controlling Hormuz has allowed Iran to move from merely defending itself to pursuing dominance in the Middle East. Roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil normally passes through the strait, so the ability to threaten shipping gives Iran enormous economic and strategic leverage. Iran could potentially charge ships for passage and use that revenue and influence to strengthen its military, expand its relationships with regional allies, and eventually become what Pape calls the Middle East’s “regional hegemon”—its dominant power.
Iran’s strategy extends beyond Hormuz. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been using pipelines to bypass the strait, moving oil toward the Red Sea and other ports. Pape argues that Iran therefore wants a wider “security belt” stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean and Red Sea. Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen could threaten ships and pipelines using these alternative routes, preserving Iran’s leverage even as new infrastructure is built around Hormuz.
Pape interprets the proposed peace agreement negotiated by Vice President JD Vance as a serious strategic concession by the United States. In his account, the agreement would have recognized Iran’s authority to manage passage through Hormuz and eventually set fees jointly with Oman. It also included provisions affecting Lebanon and the release of frozen Iranian money. Pape believes Vance approached the agreement as a business transaction—offering Iran economic benefits in return for reopening the strait—while Iran saw it as formal recognition of its new regional power.
Trump briefly accepted the agreement because emergency oil reserves were being depleted and a global energy crisis was approaching, Pape says. But the administration then began undermining its terms by supporting a continued Israeli presence in Lebanon, encouraging ships to pass through Hormuz without Iranian coordination, and placing conditions on Iran’s use of unfrozen assets. Iran responded by attacking shipping and American positions, returning both sides to open warfare.
A major part of the problem is that Iran’s remaining military capabilities are extremely difficult to destroy. Its drones and missiles are relatively small, dispersed and hidden in mountains, tunnels, warehouses and mobile launch sites across an enormous country. Pape compares finding them to searching for a particular truck somewhere in California. Iran also continues manufacturing new drones, potentially replacing them nearly as quickly as the United States destroys them.
This explains why Iran can continue hitting American bases and threatening ships despite Trump’s claim that most of its military capability has been eliminated. Iran does not need a conventional navy or air force to control Hormuz. It needs only enough drones, mines, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles to make commercial shipping unsafe. Tankers, crews and insurance companies will not enter the strait merely because the Pentagon says it is open; they must be convinced that a vessel and cargo worth hundreds of millions of dollars can pass safely.
Pape believes the resulting energy danger is severe. Emergency oil releases and pipeline routes initially softened the impact of losing oil from Hormuz, but those reserves are being depleted. The vulnerability is not limited to crude oil: much of the world’s refining capacity and refined petroleum exports are also concentrated in the Persian Gulf. Attacks on Russian refineries and the threatened closure of Red Sea routes make the problem worse. His prediction is that shortages and higher gasoline prices will increasingly affect the world economy.
This creates what Pape calls an “escalation trap.” Trump can accept a humiliating strategic loss by recognizing Iranian control of Hormuz, or he can escalate militarily—even though escalation may fail and worsen the economic crisis. Pape compares the predicament to Lyndon Johnson’s decisions during the Vietnam War. Johnson reportedly understood that escalation was unlikely to produce victory but feared that accepting defeat would destroy his domestic political agenda. Pape believes Trump faces similar incentives as the midterm elections approach.
He therefore thinks Trump may seek a temporary or symbolic military victory rather than a realistic resolution. The approximately 8,000 Marines and airborne troops reportedly positioned near the Gulf of Oman could, in Pape’s view, be used to capture a small Iranian port, island or coastal area. Such an operation might allow Trump to demonstrate that the United States had “fought back,” even if it did not permanently reopen Hormuz. Pape estimates the probability of some limited American ground operation at approximately 70 percent.
However, he believes such an operation would probably fail over time. Iran could concentrate its forces against an isolated American position, potentially killing hundreds of U.S. troops. Those deaths would not necessarily reduce support for the war among Trump’s base; in the short term, Pape argues, casualties can harden political support because withdrawal would appear to make the soldiers’ deaths meaningless. While most Americans reportedly oppose the war, support remains extremely high among MAGA Republicans.
Pape’s most disturbing warning concerns terrorism. Based on his research into suicide attacks, he argues that foreign military occupation—not simply bombing or civilian deaths—is the strongest recurring catalyst for suicide-terrorist campaigns. Capturing Iranian territory could therefore trigger attacks against American troops, commercial aircraft, hotels, embassies or civilians anywhere in the world. Such an attack might be directed by Iran or merely inspired by calls for revenge. A mass-casualty incident, he warns, could sharply increase public pressure for still greater retaliation.
He also predicts that the war could collide with America’s existing political divisions. If Democrats take control of one or both houses of Congress and try to restrict the war, Trump could claim independent constitutional authority to continue it, potentially creating a confrontation over presidential and congressional war powers. Pape fears that an unpopular war combined with domestic political hostility could produce unrest resembling the late 1960s: mass demonstrations, political violence and severe institutional conflict.
The electoral consequences depend on what happens next. Pape believes an economic crisis without a major attack on Americans would probably hurt Republicans in the midterms. Conversely, a mass-casualty attack could rally voters around Trump and improve Republican prospects. That political incentive makes escalation more likely because Trump needs to demonstrate progress before the election, even if the apparent progress lasts only a week or two.
Pape does not think the United States is likely to run out of ordinary bombs. His greater concern is the supply of sophisticated interceptors—especially Patriot missiles—needed to defend bases and ships from Iranian attacks. The United States is already drawing weapons from Europe and Asia, potentially reducing the air defenses available to Ukraine and other allies. Meanwhile, Iran’s comparatively inexpensive drones impose disproportionate defensive costs on the United States.
China, in Pape’s assessment, wants to avoid a global economic crisis but also does not want Iran destroyed, because that would strengthen America’s global position. He does not expect China to intervene directly. Russia, meanwhile, may exploit the energy disruption to increase pressure on Europe while Ukraine is attacking Russian supply lines and positions around Crimea.
Pape’s overall prediction is that economic pressure, political pressure and continuing retaliation will probably push the United States into some form of ground operation within the next several months. He thinks it will be presented as progress toward reopening Hormuz but will probably be more symbolic than effective. From there, the conflict could move toward a “forever war,” with no clear military endpoint and growing risks to the global economy, American troops, civilians and Iran’s population.
His preferred alternative is not a three-month plan designed around the midterms, but a multiyear strategy to create a more stable balance of power in the region. He argues that the administration’s focus on avoiding an immediate political defeat is preventing it from developing such a strategy. His bleak conclusion is that there is no longer an easy, credible off-ramp: opportunities to declare a limited victory and return to negotiations were missed earlier, and every new escalation makes eventual peace more difficult.
